

APPENDIX.

A.—VIEWS OF HOLSTEN, SCHMIDT, AND LÜDEMANN.

We have given in the first and second Lectures (pp. 18-62) an outline of the main positions taken up in the discussion of the subject by Baur, Holsten, Schmidt, Lüdemann, and Pfeiderer. Here we present a fuller abstract of the views of Holsten, Schmidt, and Lüdemann, who have dealt at length with the questions concerned in works not yet accessible to the English reader. It is less necessary to adopt a like course with those of Dr. Baur who preceded them, because he has not worked out the investigation so fully ; or with those of Dr. Pfeiderer whose work is the most recent, because it has been already translated. Our purpose here is simply to state the views of the writers ; and we shall do so, as far as possible, in their own language. For brevity's sake we shall represent *σάρξ*, *πνεῦμα*, *ψυχή*, *νοῦς*, and *καρδία* by their respective *initial* letters, and *ἁμαρτία* by *ἄμ*.

I. DR. CARL HOLSTEN.

Dr. Holsten's dissertation, entitled *Die bedeutung des wortes σάρξ im lehrbegriffe des Paulus*, was published in 1855, and reissued with some additions in 1868 in a

volume bearing the title *Zum Evangelium des Paulus und des Petrus*. Our abstract is taken from the latter.

At the outset he tells us that his aim in the inquiry is to disclose the basis of Paul's theological speculation; that he conceives this basis to be found in an investigation of the import of $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}$; and that he has set himself the special task of tracing the manifold variety of its use back to its fundamental (*prinzipielle*) signification. He draws his materials only from the four Epistles that are *Homologoumena*, not as pronouncing any judgment adverse to the genuineness of the *Antilegomena*, but as basing a contribution to a critical question only on grounds accepted by criticism.

The first section is entitled " σ . and the nature of man." The Pauline view of human nature is based on that of the Old Testament, and distinguished only by the precision and consistency with which it is maintained. According to Gen. ii. 7, man is $\chi\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\iota}\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\delta\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \gamma\eta\varsigma$, into which God breathed the life-breath whereby man became $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta\ \zeta\omega\sigma\alpha$. The first man as such (*der Mensch an sich*), the type of pre-Christian man (Rom. v. 19), is $\acute{\epsilon}\kappa\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \gamma\eta\varsigma\ \chi\omicron\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ (1 Cor. xv. 47). Earthy and earthly matter is the ground-element of his nature—one of the forms in which the matter of this *visible* world appears (Gal. vi. 14). Such a material is the σ ., as is shown by 1 Cor. xv. 35—a passage which, rightly understood, supplies a further decisive element for the conception. There the sinew of the argument is the difference of substance between earthly and heavenly bodies. The deniers of the resurrection had doubted its possibility on account of the earthly material substance of the σ . Paul answers that, as on earth there are differences in the material substance of animal organisms, so is there difference as to substance between heavenly and earthly

bodies. Under the idea of *σῶμα* they are posited as identical ; in respect of substance they are distinct. The substance of the *σώματα ἐπίγεια* is the earthly material substance of the *σ.* ; while that of the *σώματα ἐπουράνια* is conceived as a heavenly light-substance (verses 41, 47, 2 Cor. v. 2), with corresponding diversity of appearance—*δόξα*.

The result is that *σ.* is the earthly material living substance of the animal organism, distinguished from earthly matter generally only by the element of life. The cause of this life is the indwelling of *ψ.*, which, in Paul's view, has as close relation to the *σ.* as in the Old Testament the *nephesh* has to the *basar*, without the two being coincident. All the passages where *ψ.* occurs with Paul do not carry us beyond the conception of vital power, of life. And as the life of the *σ.* has its expression through the senses, man as *σ.* is sensuous-living matter, that is, *flesh*. But *σ.* has always its qualitative characteristic in the conception of *substance*. By this it is specifically distinguished from the conception of *σῶμα*, which is that of *form*, and especially the form under which the living substance shaped into an articulate organism subsists—that is, *body*.

We have thus gained the cardinal signification of the word, but to get at its significance for Pauline theology, we must ask : What in Paul's view was the bearing of this definition of man's nature, as being sensuous-living matter, on the religious relation of man to God ? And as in this relation the question at stake is the difference and unity of man and God, we must ask, first, Has man in Paul's view, as an element immanent in his nature and contributing to define it, aught like or akin to the nature of God, the *πνεῦμα* ? The answer to this question requires us to look into Paul's conception of *π.* We must make

it out from sparing hints. The proper natural basis of the idea, "breath, wind," has disappeared. But we are reminded of it by the conception of invisibility (*ἀόρατον*, Rom. i. 20) as a contrast to visible sensuously-palpable matter. On this immateriality rests the freedom from all that is natural—primarily, the *ἄφθαρτον* and *αἰδίον*. But that this immateriality is not freedom from all substantiality is evident from the very circumstance, that Paul can only have conceived to himself the communication of the Spirit of God to believers as a radiation of *something substantial* combined with real effect (1 Cor. ii. 12, Rom. v. 5, 2 Cor. iv. 6, Gal. iv. 6). In this way a certain materiality slips again into the conception, and the immateriality of the π. becomes at bottom merely the *negative* of "cosmic" earthly matter. He next passes in review the conceptions associated with the nature-basis of π. as self-movement. The π. *ἐνεργεῖ*, is *δύναμις*, and works *δύναμις*. It stands related above all to the will, and the standing word for its effect is *ἄγεσθαι*. It is a fiery power radiating warmth, a vital flame newly kindled at the centre of the inner life, the *καρδία*—which is in Paul's view its standing recipient. It is the principle of absolute truth (1 Cor. ii. 6), light in contrast to darkness, shining in the hidden interior. It is the principle of holiness, pre-eminently a *ἅγιον*; and by holiness is originally meant the *negative* of the natural—a freedom from all that springs out of the sensuous nature (*natürlichkeit*) of man. In all these elements the π. is thought of as *substantial*, but also as *transcending* earth and the earthly.

Returning to the question, Whether man, according to Paul, stands in any sort of unity of *nature* (*Wesen*) with God, whose substantial nature is π., Holsten holds, from the view of σ. already given, that man, being in respect of

his nature-basis σ ., stands purely in contradistinction to God. Nor has man in the ψ . anything identical with the nature of God. The ψ . is at all events, doubtless, non-material, and, in so far, must be pneumatic in the most general sense of the term. It is a life-principle too, and as such analogous to the π . But, so far as the ψ . stands in absolute relation to the natural, as the life-power of what is material, it is in turn purely opposed to the π . But Paul distinguishes a higher element in man's nature, an $\epsilon\sigma\omega$ $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ designated in Rom. vii. 9 by $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$. Have we in this an element essentially akin to the divine π ? After a review of the chief passages (1 Cor. xiv. 14 ff., Rom. vii., Rom. xii. 2) it is concluded that ν . is merely the subjective *consciousness*, the *form*, in which the subjective mind comes to know what is given to it as contents, and which may have opposite contents. It is not an element identical with, or analogous to, the nature of God.

But is not the π . itself for Paul an element in the conception of man?

Although the clear statement at 1 Cor. xv. 44 that the first man Adam was only a ψ . $\zeta\acute{\omega}\sigma\alpha$, the whole Pauline view of the world—which is simply an explication of the saying: $\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\nu\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\ \tau\acute{o}\ \psi\nu\chi\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$, $\epsilon\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\nu$ —and the absolute sway of sin from Adam to Christ might seem to indicate that the π . had been until Christ purely transcendent, and had only become immanent in humanity through Christ, expositors have, on the basis of various passages in the admitted Epistles, thought themselves entitled to assume also a "human-creaturally" π ., although no one has yet specified what sort of conception Paul has associated with it, or what sort of significance it has for the nature of man. To determine the question we must go through all the pas-

sages that bear on it, and accordingly, after mentioning those where the reference to the transcendent $\pi.$ is clear, Holsten proceeds to examine the others on which the opposite view is usually rested. He thinks that at 1 Cor. v. 3, 4, but slight reflection suffices to discern the divine $\pi.$ conferred on the Apostle as the source of his apostolic dignity and power. Whence else could he have had the power, or wished to take the right, of *παραδοῦναι τῷ Σατανᾷ*? The passage shows the arbitrariness of the canon that the addition *ἐμου* or *ἡμῶν* or the like makes the $\pi.$ human. At Rom. i. 9 *ἐν τῷ πνεύματι μου* denotes the same apostolic $\pi.$, the spirit specially conferred on him and enabling him to render pneumatic service. Had Paul meant the sincerity of his service in contrast to hypocritical semblance, he would have said *ἐκ καρδίας*. In accordance with this passage we must explain 2 Cor. ii. 13; xii. 18; vii. 13; 1 Cor. xvi. 18; Rom. xii. 11; xv. 30, of the divine $\pi.$ at work in the preachers of the gospel (and believers). At Gal. vi. 18 the express prominence of the $\pi.$ is only to be explained by its being understood of the divine $\pi.$ become immanent in the Galatians, which was in danger of being quenched in the carnal nature. So with 1 Cor. vii. 34 and 2 Cor. vii. 1—a passage, however, very difficult to be explained in keeping with Pauline conceptions, according to which the $\sigma.$ is the principle and source of pollution and so cannot be the object of it, which could only be the *σῶμα*. The whole passage vi. 14-vii. 1 is probably not genuine.

In all these passages $\pi.$ is used only of believers, in whom the transcendent has become immanent. As contrast thereto stands in 2 Cor. xi. 4 a $\pi.$ *ἕτερον*, where the *λαμβάνειν* itself shows the conception of transcendence.

Passing to the cases of $\pi.$ being defined by a genitive of quality, he holds that passages like Rom xi. 8, viii. 15

show that the modern view of a subjective "disposition" of the human mind is quite alien to them. π . here denotes, quite in keeping with its idea, an *objective*—as it were, hypostatically presented—pneumatic power, which, as the expressions $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ and $\acute{\epsilon}\delta\omega\kappa\epsilon\nu$ show, is conceived as in itself transcendent, and is therefore set forth as bestowed by God on man at a definite time and as being felt at work in the $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$ (Rom. viii. 15, comp. Rom. viii. 26 f.) to impel man to a definite action. Thus are to be explained Rom. i. 4; viii. 15; xi. 8; 1 Cor. iv. 21; Gal. vi. 1; 2 Cor. iv. 13. But Rom. viii. 16 and 1 Cor. ii. 11 are said to be decisive in support of a human π . Now at the former passage interpreters vary, and Baur is evidently right in taking the π . $\eta\mu\acute{\omega}\nu$ as the π . $\nu\acute{\iota}\omicron\theta\epsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$, $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \hat{\phi}\ \kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}\zeta\omicron\mu\epsilon\nu\ \text{'}\text{Αββ}\hat{\alpha}\ \acute{\omicron}\ \text{πατ}\acute{\eta}\rho$, which again, according to Gal. iv. 6, is the transcendent divine Spirit, the same objective π ., which in Rom. viii. 26 $\acute{\upsilon}\text{πε}\rho\epsilon\nu\tau\upsilon\chi\acute{\alpha}\nu\epsilon\iota\ \sigma\tau\epsilon\nu\acute{\alpha}\gamma\text{-}\mu\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\alpha\lambda\acute{\eta}\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma$, whose effect God discerns in our hearts in which it has become immanent. At the latter passage, after a view of the connection, it is admitted that there is mention of a pneumatic element in man as the principle of his self-consciousness. But so far is this π . from being one akin in nature to the π . of God, that it is only by communication of the divine π . that man is enabled to apprehend the pneumatic, and to discern that even with *this* π ., and notwithstanding of it, he remains an $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma\ \psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, who certainly has a π ., but only the π . $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\acute{\omicron}\sigma\mu\omicron\nu$. For it is evident that for Paul what he calls $\tau\omicron\ \pi$. $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\upsilon$ here coincides with the π . $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \kappa\acute{\omicron}\sigma\mu\omicron\nu$, and this coincides with the $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$, the spirit of sensuousness which in the $\nu\omicron\hat{\upsilon}\varsigma$ comes to consciousness—that is, the contrast to the π . This ψ . is, like the ν ., doubtless a pneumatic element, because everything non-material is π . in the most general sense of the word; it doubtless falls under

the conception of $\pi.$ as abstract generic conception for the non-material; but it has nothing in common with the concrete $\pi.$, the $\tau\acute{o}$ $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$, the sole *reality* of the abstract generic conception. So at Rom. ii. 29 the $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\tau\omicron\mu\acute{\eta}$ $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ is $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha\tau\iota$, but this does not mean the sphere of the subjective spirit, which is correctly designated by $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ in opposition to $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\tau\hat{\omega}$ $\phi\alpha\nu\epsilon\rho\hat{\omega}$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}$. It is a circumcision of the inner subject, which has its existence in the objective sphere of the non-natural, non-sensuous, non-external, because it transcends the letter of Scripture, that is, the external carnal understanding of the word, according to which $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota\tau\omicron\mu\acute{\eta}$ certainly refers to the externally visible material element of the subject, the $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$.

An accurate analysis of all the passages thus shows that there does not, according to Paul's conception, exist in man an organ corresponding to the divine $\pi.$, a human $\pi.$ receptive of the divine. That organ is the $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$; the principle of self-consciousness is the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$; anything higher is the divine $\pi.$ The essential elements of man as such are for Paul only $\sigma.$, $\psi.$, $\nu.$, which have the appearance (*Erscheinung*) of an individual Ego in the $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$, the organic form for the substance of the $\sigma.$ This result is substantially in keeping with the distinction, not always adhered to, in the Old Testament between *ruach* and *nephesh*.

With this result we are now in a position to determine the significance of the $\sigma.$ for Paul's religious anthropology. As there is no essential element in man like to the essence of God—to the $\pi.$ —and the contrast between $\pi.$ and $\sigma.$ is thus not an anthropological but a metaphysical one, and as the $\nu.$, as a mere theoretic form indifferent to its contents, is no essential peculiarity characteristic of man overagainst God, we may see (*so*

begreift es sich) how in the religious relation of God and man the nature of the latter may for Paul coincide with the σ . animated by the ψ .; how the religious relation generally may be presented as that of the π ., the non-material mental substance, to the σ ., the material sensuous substance; and, if that relation in abstract generality is that of the finite to the infinite, we may see that for Paul the *conception of σ . is the expression for the conception of the finite.* In this conception of the finite the σ . has its most proper (*eigentlichste*) significance; hence may be explained its comprehensive use and the variety of its applications.

Hence, first, *ἄνθρωπος* as *finite subject* in religion is identical and interchangeable with σ . (comp. 1 Cor. iii. 4 with iii. 1, 3); *ἀνθρώπινος* and *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον* are parallel with *σαρκικός* and *κατὰ σάρκα* (Rom. vi. 19; 1 Cor. iii. 21 comp. with 1 Cor. i. 26; 2 Cor. xi. 18; and 2 Cor. i. 12 comp. with 1 Cor. ii. 13). Mankind in this sense of finiteness is called *πάντα σ .* (Rom. iii. 20; 1 Cor. i. 29; Gal. ii. 16) and man *σ . καὶ αἷμα* (Gal. i. 16 comp. with 1 Cor. xv. 50). Now God as π . and man as σ ., infinite and finite, stand in absolute contrast. Physically the σ . is identical with *φθορά* (1 Cor. xv. 50, 42). As *φθαρτός* man is also *θνητός*. The σ . is the principle of perishableness. In the intellectual sphere the σ . is the principle of error. The *σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα* are *μωροί*. The π . alone is the principle of the knowledge of absolute truth (1 Cor. ii. 10, 14). The *νοῦς τῆς σαρκός* (Col. ii. 18; Paul in the four Epistles has the thing, but not the expression) clings to the material, the sensuously perceptible. But the contrast reveals itself above all in the practical domain—the will. The σ . is, in virtue of its indwelling ψ ., material substance having sensuous life, which expresses itself in *ἐπιθυμία*, sensuous impulse,

desire. This is the *δύναμις* immanent in the flesh, the necessary manifestation of the sarkic substance. Its manifestations are *παθήματα* (Rom. vii. 5 ; Gal. v. 24), because man in them has not the freedom of self-determination, but is given up powerlessly to a nature-power and nature-necessity. The *ἐπιθυμία* is a *νόμος* in the *σ.* ; the *σ.* obeys not the law of God, *οὐδε γὰρ δύναται*. The *ἐπιθυμία* is in Paul's view the most especial (*eigenste*) *self* of man, in which is displayed the most complete contrast between man and God, *σ.* and *π.* The contrast of *substances* becomes a contrast of their effects, when, as in Gal. v., the *ἔργα τῆς σαρκός* are set overagainst the fruit of the Spirit. The *σ.*, as the sensuousness of man's living material substance, is at the same time evil. All evil has its principle only in it. All sins, which we apprehend as sins of "the finite spirit"—the spiritual sins of idolatry, heresy, variance, envy—are derived by Paul from the *σ.* (Gal. v. 19–21). This follows consistently from the dualism of substances, and from the fact that they in Paul's view are a power completely dominating the subject, which is at bottom merely meeting-point and form for the workings of the finite and infinite substance (comp. Gal. v. 17). The *σ.* thus stands in absolute contrast to the *π.*, the nature of God ; but, if it is the true nature of man, it follows that, in Paul's view, *man as such (an sich) stands simply in contradistinction to God.* This is only one of the forms of the dualism pervading St. Paul's doctrinal system. [Here comes in the passage as to the grounds and limits of this dualism, quoted in the text at p. 26 f.]

He then proceeds to follow out *σ.*, thus defined, in its relation to the *νόμος*, as to which he holds that the forms of the ritual law are treated by Paul as purely external, relative to the *σ.*, and not properly belonging to

the νόμος as πνευματικός;¹ and thereafter in reference to the conception of sin, which is essentially bound up with it. Man as such is evil. The σ. is *essentially* a σ. ἁμαρτίας, and man of himself is, as such σ., in respect of his substantial nature ἁμαρτία, which, however, is not to be taken as equivalent to our conception of sin as accompanied by consciousness and sense of guilt. These are *subjective* elements; ἄμ. denotes merely *sin in the objective sense*, all that, in purely objective relation to the idea of God, reveals itself in the ἐπιθυμία as *unholiness of the sensuous-material substance*. Subjective sin, sin in the proper sense of the word, only arises through the revelation of the holy will of God in the ἐντολή ἁγία or the νόμος πνευματικός; under which ἄμ. becomes παράβασις, conscious transgression. The σ. is the nature-ground, the ἄμ. the objective presupposition, of all subjective sin. Sin is a necessity without freedom; man is a slave *determined to sin*; but he has the *consciousness* of the sinful deed as *his own*; and it is this dualism, the consciousness of his *own* act with the feeling of being absolutely determined to it by the substance of the body, that brings man to that exclamation of despair, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from this body of death?"¹

¹ Perhaps, Holsten says, Paul reckoned the ritual law among the πατρικαὶ παραδόσεις. At any rate, in his polemic he ignored it and dealt only with the moral law.

¹ Holsten regards the controversy as to whether Rom. vii. 14 ff. refers to the state of the regenerate or the unregenerate as altogether superfluous (*durchaus müssiger*) so far as Paul is concerned. The connection shows it to be "a representation of the religious history of the Hebrew subjective spirit, carried back from the apparent reality to its idea (*begriff*), and expressed by the individuality, which must be in plain language (*ohne phrase*) called the Hebrew Ego attaining to clearness respecting itself."

But how is this doctrine of sin and death as a necessary consequence of the finiteness of man's nature to be reconciled with Rom. v. 12 ff., where they seem presented as the consequence of the one sin of the one first man, Adam? Without entering into the particulars of Holsten's discussion, which in this field, as in those of Christology, the new life of believers, and the resurrection, passes beyond our limits, suffice it to say that Holsten regards Rom. v. 12-21 as forming a transition from the first great section of the Epistle, i. 18—v. 11, to the second section, ch. vi.-xii. The first section deals with the objective righteousness brought through Christ, presupposing the non-righteousness of man, and conferred as a gift of grace apart from the law; and the second seeks to obviate objections to the new doctrine from a Jewish or Jewish-Christian point of view, based on its apparent incompatibility with the legal requirement of *subjective* righteousness. The passage v. 12-21 delineates in a few broad traits the new form in which the history of the religious development of humanity reveals itself to the Christian consciousness, setting forth the world as determined (*bestimmte*) by Adam and by Christ respectively, and the law with its intermediate position and relative-absolute aim of leading the old over into the new. And he comes to the conclusion that Paul views the development of the world-order from a double standpoint—from that of objective necessity, the idea and will of God, and from that of free subjectivity, the nature of man. The two modes of view are not logically reconciled, but run separately side by side, and fall dualistically apart; and Paul utters the contradictory elements equally as truth. We too must therefore in the sense of Paul think the contradiction and the two together, the objective and the subjective form of world-development. Although

men were objectively made sinners and given up to death through an act of God by means of Adam's transgression, yet at the same time their subjective nature—their σ .—makes them sinners and drives them into death.

II. DR. RICHARD SCHMIDT.

In a treatise on "the Pauline Christology," published in 1870, Dr. Schmidt devotes his first chapter to "the contrast of Flesh and Spirit." While agreeing in the main with Holsten, he deems it not superfluous to subject to critical examination the different views entertained on the question.

The usual course is to start from the fact that the flesh appears with Paul as the seat, if not the source, of sin, and from the conviction—otherwise acquired—that the Apostle may not be regarded as supporting the so-called theory of sensuousness; and to assign to the conception of σ . a contents transcending or altogether leaving the sphere of sensuousness, so as to facilitate the reference to it of phenomena essentially mental (*geistiger*). Before investigating the warrant for such an extension or transformation of the original conception, we have first to assure ourselves of what is the proper meaning of the extension. The answers to this question are not so distinct as could be wished, when almost in one breath σ . is defined as the seat of sinful inclination, or sinful human nature, and then as this sinful inclination itself, or the tendency of the will as opposed to God, or human sinfulness in general (as by Neander, Schmid, Messner). As if these were not quite disparate conceptions, or as if we were at liberty to impose on a word, whose primary sense is—rightly or wrongly—dropped, any signification we please, to be applied in each case according to the

fancy of the expositor. Even assuming the technical use of the word in Paul to prove an extension beyond its original import, we may not without arbitrariness discard the idea of an unity underlying that use; and we may reasonably claim that each signification so assumed shall make good not only its general *motive*, but also its association with the original contents of the conception.

The latter demand, if admitted as valid, is fatal to the view which takes σ . as denoting sin itself according to the ground-form which conditions its individual manifestations: for Schmidt at least cannot see what connection of ideas is held to subsist between the material substance of the body, which σ . originally denotes, and a tendency of the mental life. This objection remains in force, even when the sensuous element is so far retained as to define that tendency specially as "fleshliness," that is, as conditioned by a preponderance of the material side (as by Ernesti); for that which has its peculiarity determined by the flesh is not on that account itself flesh. Nor does it mend the matter to fill up that sensible gap by a series of stages of development (Julius Müller), so long as there inevitably remains at the decisive spot a chasm through an utter abandoning of the connection previously in some fashion retained. But apart from such general considerations the view in question cannot be maintained in the face of the definite distinction which Paul makes (Rom. vii. 17f., 25) between the σ . and the sin dwelling in it, as indeed on such an assumption the combination σ . ἀμ. (Rom. viii. 3) would be absolutely meaningless. The attempt of Julius Müller to get quit of this difficulty by retaining for such passages the morally indifferent anthropological import of σ . is not consistent with the close connection between the seventh and eighth chapters of the Epistle to the Romans, which precludes our

assuming such a difference of sense as that explanation demands.

It might seem as if the objections urged against the identification of σ . with sin did not apply to the other more usual view, under which σ . is held to denote *human nature*, so far as it is a source of sinful conduct for the Ego. But here, too, we must ask: What is precisely meant? Does the σ . denote directly *sinful* human nature, so that the element of corruption adhering to it forms an immediate constituent of the conception? Or is it meant that the word is in itself merely an expression for human nature in general, but that the latter empirically exists only in such a shape as to produce a sinfulness of the personal conduct conditioned by it? Against the former nearly the same exegetical objections may be urged as were adduced before; the statements of the Apostle that in his flesh dwells nothing good, or that he with his flesh serves the law of sin, would contain a truth, but a truth so indubitable as hardly to be distinguished from a platitude; and a combination like σ . $\acute{\alpha}\mu$. would be a hardly conceivable pleonasm. Besides, we ask how could a σ . in that case be ascribed to Christ, and yet His sinlessness retained? Hardly any other course would be left than to take the word in such cases in a morally neutral sense; and then we may ask with what warrant there has been introduced into the conception an element which may thus be laid aside at pleasure? This leads accordingly to the modification, under which the element of sinfulness belongs, not to the conception in itself, but only to its empiric reality (Weiss). But in that case how should the formulae *περιπατεῖν κατὰ σάρκα, ἐν σαρκὶ εἶναι* involve, as unquestionably in Pauline usage they do, a moral censure? They would of themselves mean “a walk according to human nature,” but not according

to human nature so and so determined—the general character of the formulæ not leading us to seek in them such a more precise definition. Hofmann strikes out a middle course not liable to the previous objections. He takes σ . as denoting not human nature in itself, or as sinful, but as in its present state conditioned by the sin of the first man. This is explained to mean that man is, after Old Testament usage, called “flesh,” as a being dependent and perishable; it designates him on the side of dependence, not of sinfulness. “But,” says Hofmann, “liable to such perishableness, he is also liable to sin. A will placed in such conditions cannot be righteous, life in so impure a body cannot be pure.” But, apart from the question how far Hofmann is warranted in speaking of the body *a priori* as “impure,” we are naturally led to ask how, assuming that Jesus has taken the present human nature, it stands with His sinlessness, if the two—perishableness and sinfulness—are to be so closely connected? And, even if we hold the personal conduct of Jesus not to have been conditioned by this His nature, as is the case empirically with us, we may still ask on what Hofmann’s definition is based? and what entitles us at all to find in σ . an expression for collective human nature, whether in itself or with any sort of *de facto* qualification?

This question seems all the more called for, the less that the current application of the conception is of itself natural. Long ecclesiastico-ascetic usage of the word “flesh” associated with the world and the devil, makes it difficult for us to recall the original meaning that lies under its technical application; but, if we consider the matter apart from this traditional habit, we cannot but think it a far from obvious, and indeed a pretty strange, usage to designate human nature as a whole simply as

flesh. It has no doubt been claimed already for the Old Testament, and asserted as a general Biblical usage, inasmuch as there the whole man is designated absolutely as flesh, even in connections which are far from bearing exclusively or preponderantly on the sensuous side of his being. . . . With the restriction that the latter statement applies at bottom only to the *kol-basar*, which has become in the strictest sense technical, the fact must be undoubtedly recognized as correct; but we must deny that any inference may be drawn thence for the correctness of the view in question. In all such cases *basar* denotes the concrete "man," not the abstract "human nature" or the "human" generally; and it seems to betoken an inadequate attention to the distinction, when the transition from the one to the other is accounted quite easy and obvious (Luthardt). For the concrete man is actually flesh in the strictest sense, although animated by a personal life-spirit; in view of others he exists only as such, belonging as such to the phenomenal world. It would not even be correct to find here an extension of the original conception, seeing that the sole difference from its application elsewhere amounts to this, that in the one case the Ego is distinguished from its material body as something belonging to it, while in the other this body itself as animated by personal life is elevated into the subject. Again, it is not an extension but an abandonment of the original sense, when "flesh" is held to denote human nature, inasmuch as the general conception of substance or material, which the word involves, is exchanged for the quite heterogeneous one of "nature" or "kind." Granting ever so duly that this nature is that of a corporeal, material being, the material body and the nature characteristically conditioned by it are none the less different things; and it is not easy to

explain how the substance of the former could become an expression for the latter. Where, besides, *basar* is predicated of man absolutely, it is in no other sense than that in which the formula "all flesh" relates at times also to the animal world (*e.g.* Gen. vi. 19; vii. 16), or in which it is said of the horses of the Egyptians that they are flesh and not spirit (Is. xxxi. 3); whence we may see how little the analogy of the Old Testament use can be appealed to for the sense ascribed to σ . of "the human with the accessory idea of weakness and sinfulness" (Tholuck). Nor in the New Testament writings other than those of Paul is there any necessity for going beyond the bounds of Old Testament usage and enlarging the proper idea of $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ into that of empiric human nature,—not even at Matt. xxvi. 41, where the temptation, into which the disciples are in danger of falling, threatens them from an outward need which affects the sensuous man, and the flesh may be conceived accordingly as subject to it, in so far as it is animated and accessible to sensuous impressions.

After all this it would require very cogent grounds to make us in Paul's case recognize a signification of σ ., for which no sure warrant can be found elsewhere. But not only are the arguments adduced for it not so cogent, but indications telling against it are got rid of by its supporters after a very unsatisfactory fashion. Schmidt reviews the chief passages, maintaining that at Rom. i. 3; ix. 5; Gal. ii. 23, 29; 1 Cor. x. 8, where $\kappa\alpha\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\alpha$ is used as regards Christ, Israel, and the people of Israel respectively, there is no necessity for enlarging the conception beyond its original limits; that at other passages, where the flesh is represented as the peculiar sphere and characteristic determining element of non-Christian being and conduct (such as 1 Cor. iii. 3, where

κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖν is obviously equivalent to κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν elsewhere, 1 Cor. i. 26 f. where σοφοὶ κατὰ σάρκα are identical with σοφοὶ τοῦ κόσμου, and Philem. 16: καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ καὶ ἐν κυρίῳ), it is of the utmost importance to distinguish between what is on each occasion involved in the thought, and what is implied in the conception of the flesh itself (as in the latter passage, where, so far as the general sense goes, we might render ἐν σαρκί; "in the human-natural relation in which he stands to thee as a slave," but σ. itself does not denote a relation any more than κυρίος does); and that, even where the proper notion may seem indefinitely enlarged (as in the apparent equivalence of σ. to κόσμος), we must bear in mind that σ. denotes not so much the body as the material substance of this body, that this substance is in keeping with the Old Testament view (Gen. ii. 7; comp. 1 Cor. xv. 4, 7), essentially identical with that of the earthly world generally, sharing its common character of materiality; that, as flesh, man is a member of the phenomenal world; that flesh is the medium of all his relations with this world; and that it may therefore denote as well the sphere within which the purely natural being and action of man is carried on, as that which determines the peculiarity of such being or action, without renouncing the category of substance or matter originally underlying it.

The original meaning of the word is to be retained, even where it emerges in definite ethical relations. Great stress is laid by Wieseler and Ritschl on the fact that when Paul opposes the π. to the σ., he is to be understood as speaking not of the human, but of the divine π.; and so σ. cannot denote the bodily nature of man only, but must denote his being as a whole (*das gesammte Wesen*). But, even granting the correctness of

the premiss, the stringency of the inference drawn from it may be questioned. When Paul opposes the non-Christian and Christian conduct as a *περιπατεῖν κατὰ σάρκα* and *περιπατεῖν κατὰ π.*, he wishes to describe them according to the principle or determining power which empirically characterises each; if this is for the Christian's walk the indwelling Spirit of God, why should the Apostle not oppose to this the flesh in the proper sense, in so far as it may be otherwise shown that he *de facto* discerned in it the power determining the non-Christian life? We see easily that this argument must at bottom assume what awaits proof as proved already. So we may admit that the formulae *κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖν* and *κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν* ultimately amount in substance to the same thing, without allowing the inference of a coincidence in conception. Lastly, if appeal is made to Gal. v. 19 ff., as including not merely sensuous sins, but also such as hatred and envy among works of the flesh, it is not necessarily involved in the consistency of a view which finds the empiric ground of sin generally in the material body, that all individual sins should admit of being with equal directness traced back to it. At any rate, two questions require to be kept quite distinct—the one whether such a view, objectively regarded, is really adequate for an explanation of sin in its various shapes; and the other, whether it is actually to be found in the Apostle's writings. The negation of the former is no reason for denying the latter, at least so long as we do not come to the inquiry with the absolute presupposition that there cannot be found in the Apostle's cycle of thought anything at variance with the view we ourselves deem correct—a presupposition, which purely historical research cannot make without depriving itself beforehand of its freedom, and which strict orthodoxy (*Schrift-*

gläubigkeit) cannot make without practically renouncing its own principle of unconditional submission to the Apostolic utterances.

The less may we evade the weight of the positive indications, which bring the proper signification of σ ., elsewhere demonstrable, definitely enough into prominence also in its ethical relations. When Paul places the law of sin in the members (Rom. vii. 23), when he speaks of a destruction of the body of sin (Rom. vi. 6), or of a mortifying the mischievous (*ränkevoll*) activity of the body (Rom. viii. 13) he lays a stress on the bodily nature, which must be at least surprising for those who defend the view hitherto considered. . . . Evidently the conceptions "flesh" on the one hand and "body" or "members" on the other are treated as essentially equivalent: to the σ . in which sin dwells (Rom. vii. 18) correspond the μέλη, in which the law of sin has its seat (verse 23), just as at Rom. viii. 13, to the κατὰ σάρκα ζῆν is opposed the θανατοῦν τὰς πράξεις τοῦ σώματος. Both are to be explained from σ . being the substance of this material body itself, consisting of members.

After some remarks controverting the view of Ritschl, who had questioned the practical equivalence of the two conceptions in dealing with Rom. vii., Schmidt finds himself now in a position to judge what warrant there is for speaking of σ . as used in several significations, as is done by Ernesti, who distinguishes a physiologico-anthropological, a historico-anthropological, and an ethico-anthropological standpoint. Such a view is only got by either raising collateral conceptions associated for us with the idea into immediate constituents of it, or by attributing what is implied in the general thought of a passage simply to one notion contained in it. Paul's peculiarity is not to be sought in his having remodelled the notion in ques-

tion, but only in the equally comprehensive and precise significance which, with contents unchanged, it holds in his doctrinal system. Σ . with him is neither the whole undivided human nature, nor is it one side thereof in distinction from another; it never means anything else than the material substance of the animal, including the human, body.

Having thus fixed the signification of the one member of the antithesis, we may acquire a more precise insight into the peculiar nature of that antithesis. As the conception of σ . is not simply tantamount to that of the human, the divine as such cannot form the immediate contrast to it. Even where the Spirit of God stands definitely overagainst the flesh, the emphasis will rest not so much on the genitive of more precise definition, as rather on the chief idea which is thereby more precisely defined. In other words, the question turns on the contrast of flesh and spirit, not immediately on that of God and man (the latter conceived of as he exists naturally in experience). The distinction thus made, which it is of decisive importance to keep in view, leads us on at once to distinguish between the general conception of spirit and the reality existing in π . Θεοῦ, even in the event of Paul's being supposed not to know another reality of spirit. This may be tested by the fact that we cannot by any means, wherever the idea of π . appears in an antithetic relation, mentally supply at once the more precise definition of the divine, without altering somehow the sharpness of the contrast. Especially instructive in this respect are the passages in which not σ . but γράμμα forms the contrast (Rom. vii. 6; Rom. ii. 29; 2 Cor. iii. 6); but the same holds true of cases where σ . forms the antithesis, such as Gal. iv. 29; Rom. viii. 9, and throughout this earlier part of the eighth chapter.

where there are not expressly more precise definitions added ; as well as at Gal. v. 16 ff. In all these cases the expressions are to be left entirely in their generality.

In this light the question much discussed and diversely answered—Whether in the passages adduced we have to think of the divine or the human π .—has become for us one without an object, as it concerns a conception which “desires to be left entirely general.” But we may not escape the other question, Whether in the Apostle’s opinion the divine Spirit is the sole reality of this conception, in such a sense that the π . stands overagainst man as such in absolute transcendence ? or whether it is in any way a constituent part of his nature ? The former is energetically maintained by Holsten, according to whom man in himself, as conceived by Paul, is held to have absolutely no element in himself really opposed to the σ .; and Weiss maintains that, though occasionally the Apostle follows a popular use of language, this may not be looked on as at all a criterion for his anthropology, which excludes the specific conception of π . But the number of passages, where to all appearance there is mention of a spirit of man, is far from inconsiderable (Rom. i. 9 ; 2 Cor. ii. 13, vii. 13 ; 1 Cor. xvi. 18 ; Gal. vi. 18 ; Phil. iv. 23 ; 2 Tim. iv. 22 ; Philem. 23 ; 1 Cor. v. 3 ff. ; ii. 11 ; vii. 34 ; 2 Cor. vii. 1 ; Col. ii. 5) ; and the defenders of the view in question find themselves compelled to deviate from the current explanation of them in a way not very happy. In almost all these passages Holsten would have us understand the π . of the divine spirit become subjective, and Weiss of a spiritual life of higher origin produced by that spirit. Holsten thinks himself able to show that the addition of the personal pronoun does not make the π . human at 1 Cor. v. 4 and Rom. i. 9. He tells us that at the former passage it needs “but

slight reflection" to recognise in the π . the divine Spirit, "the source of apostolic dignity and of apostolic power"; but it likewise needs but little reflection to see that Paul could not possibly regard something common to him with all Christians as such a source of his specific apostolic standing. Besides, the "power" of the Lord Jesus appears alongside of the π . of the Apostle as something different from it, which would have hardly been the case, had Paul understood under the latter the Spirit of Christ himself. Lastly, at verse 3 the contrast: $\acute{\alpha}\pi\omicron\nu\tau\omega\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota$, $\pi\alpha\rho\acute{\omega}\nu\ \delta\grave{\epsilon}\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota$ can hardly be taken as other than anthropological, and, as it is plain that the mention of π . in verse 4 looks back to these words, the π . must be the same in the two cases. That the passage yields no natural sense in the ordinary view, is a mere groundless assertion. As to Rom. i. 9 the objections urged by Holsten against Philippi's view are certainly well-founded; but he has not observed that the addition $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\ \mu\omicron\nu$ admits of a more satisfactory explanation than is given by him. The Apostle calls God to witness that he serves him in the cause of the gospel not merely by the outward activity of preaching, but also inwardly (the words $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\omega}\ \pi\nu\acute{\epsilon}\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\ \mu\omicron\nu$ affirm this) in so far as all his thoughts are applied to advance it in the churches (so Hofmann). At other passages too, where the personal pronoun occurs, Holsten's view is inadmissible. At 1 Cor. v. 5 to take the π . to be saved of the communicated Spirit of God yields no effective meaning—unless we should for $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tau\hat{\eta}\ \eta\acute{\mu}\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha$ read $\acute{\epsilon}\iota\varsigma\ \tau\hat{\eta}\nu\ \eta\acute{\mu}\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\nu$ in the sense that the Spirit should remain preserved for the sinner till the day of judgment. As here, so at 2 Cor. vii. 1 the spirit is contrasted with the σ ., at 1 Cor. vii. 34 with the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$; and at these passages the impossibility of Holsten's explanation becomes apparent. For in the

case of the Holy Spirit of God even become subjective there can be no talk of a defilement, or yet of a sanctifying; and, even if with Holsten we question the genuineness of the former passage, there remains the latter, in which the parallelism with *σώματι* precludes us from thinking of aught else than a sanctifying of the spirit (not through the Spirit). No less clearly is the distinction of the human *π.* from the divine apparent at Rom. viii. 16, where Holsten's identification of the *π. ἡμῶν* with the previously mentioned *π. νοθεσίας* is hardly anything else than a renunciation—forced upon him by his theory—of the natural exegesis, which points clearly enough to the referring the words *αὐτο τὸ π.* to the immediately preceding *π. νοθεσίας*. Besides, the thought which Holsten gets from the passage has too much of a modern abstract character to commend itself as Pauline.

The view of Weiss is not so much affected by these objections, but is, regarded purely in itself, the less natural, as it occupies an intermediate position between the ordinary view and that of Holsten. According to it the *π.* in the passages in question is a higher spiritual life wrought in believers, which is distinguished from the divine Spirit even as having become immanent in man, so that we should have to assume in the redeemed a two-fold communicated *π.* But Paul knows only of a received Spirit; and the higher life possessed by the Christian is only a life led in the power of this Spirit; besides, it would be difficult to form a really clear conception of what is meant, if, on the one hand, the objective power, as communicated to us (N. B.!), of the divine Spirit is by no means to be entirely merged into that subjective spiritual life produced by it, and, on the other hand, *alongside* of this latter, the natural spirit-life is regarded as continuing to subsist. Paul certainly

distinguishes the divine $\pi.$, even as having already become immanent, always in some way from the $\pi.$ which he designates as that of man; but for that very reason under the latter can only be understood the human inner life generally, which, as but relatively penetrated by the Spirit of God, continues also relatively distinct from it. If, on the other hand, this latter side is expressly marked off, that which remains behind is no longer to be distinguished from the divine become immanent; else we should—seeing that in fact the Spirit as communicated has thereby at the same time become a subjective spirit—be obliged to assume a *threefold* sphere in which the life of believers is accomplished. Weiss remarks quite correctly that in Rom. viii. 16 the Spirit which gives the certainty of childship is distinguished from our spirit, “in which the childlike confidence is wrought;” but, if this latter is apprehended as a “higher spirit-life” first wrought in us, it cannot be thought of from the outset as devoid of that childlike confidence; and there will therefore be no proper meaning in saying that this is for the first time called forth “in it.” Still clearer is the passage Rom. viii. 10, where (in Schmidt’s conviction) under the $\pi\nu.$ is to be understood the human as distinguished from the divine. For evidently the intention is to express what takes place in man when Christ, that is, more specially Christ’s Spirit, dwells in him; and likewise the contrast to $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, which at any rate denotes only one side of human nature, naturally requires that overagainst it something should be affirmed of another side of that nature. It is obvious accordingly that we cannot think of a something simply wrought by the divine Spirit itself.

It cannot well be questioned that Paul was quite accustomed to speak of spirit as a constituent element of

man's nature. But it has been alleged that this anthropological *usus loquendi* does not stand [in any inner relation to the specific conception of the $\pi.$, which dominates the Apostle's whole religious thought ; and it has been urged that the element of Spirit in the specific sense is one absolutely transcending natural humanity, on the ground of 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff., and of the fact that in Rom. vii. 22 ff. it is not the $\pi.$ but the $\nu.$ that is opposed to the flesh. As to the former passage, Holsten ought not to have left unnoticed the specialty of the utterance, which lies in the *concrete* sense in which the conceptions of $\pi.$ and $\psi.$ are here used. The passage doubtless directly asserts that the first man as distinguished from the second *was* not spirit, *i.e.*, a nature of spirit ; but this by no means excludes spirit as something pertaining to him. According to the Biblical account man becomes a living soul just by the combination of a life-breath issuing from God with the material body formed of earth—a view, which may be recognised in Paul's familiar juxtaposition of $\sigma.$ or $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ and $\pi.$; but for this very reason man in the unity of his earthly being cannot well be designated as $\pi.$, although it may be said that he possesses a $\pi.$ Further, as regards the distinction between $\pi.$ and $\psi.$, it is in the main correctly put (by Hofmann) to the effect that the former denotes the moving life-power, the latter the individual life in its state as conditioned. Now such a conditioned character is given for the individual human life by the very fact of its being linked to a material body ; and from this is explained the close relation in which with Paul the $\psi.$ stands to the $\sigma.$, so that in this respect $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ may be used as synonymous with $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ (1 Cor. ii. 14). But that between the conceptions of a $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ and a $\psi.$ $\xi\hat{\omega}\sigma\alpha$ on the one hand, and a $\pi\nu\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ and a $\pi.$ $\xi\omega\sigma\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}$ on the other, there subsists an essential dis-

inction, need hardly be mentioned after what has been said. In the Apostle's view Christ has become a $\pi.$ $\zeta\omega\omicron\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$ only through the resurrection; hence this predicate does not belong to the earthly Jesus, who may rather fall under the conception of a $\psi.$ $\zeta\hat{\omega}\sigma\alpha$. As little can believers, though possessing the Spirit in the specific sense, be called $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$; and so the passage adduced is far from fitted to prove the absolute transcendence of the $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$. Verse 46 itself would not really yield this, even if the whole connection did not make it probable that we should there supply $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ from verse 44.

As to Rom. vii. the prominence given to $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ at the close is certainly not accidental, but is accounted for by the course of thought. For its meaning 1 Cor. xiv. 14 is rightly compared, where $\nu.$ denotes the intelligent reflecting consciousness. Certainly it cannot be limited in Rom. vii. to the intellectual (*das theoretische*), for there is ascribed to it a $\sigma\nu\nu\eta\delta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ and even a $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$; but as little may we in the case of the latter think of a practical willing complete in itself, else it would remain inconceivable why the action should thus fail to be accordant with this willing. The whole thought of the section requires rather the conception of an inward movement (*Regung*), which, immediately conjoined with that $\sigma\nu\nu\eta\delta\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ $\tau\hat{\omega}$ $\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\omega$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$, must be thought of as practical impulse, but does not completely carry itself out into real energetic willing; that joy in the law itself can only denote in substance such a complaisance (*Wohlgefallen*) as accompanies the inwardly wrought knowledge of the excellence of the law's contents. Though the question here therefore is not that of a merely intellectual knowledge, the starting point of the whole conception lies on the side of consciousness; in no

case at least can the ν . be an expression for the whole inner life. Doubtless the mode of expression seems as if the Ego were set simply overagainst the σ . as the impersonal side; but this representation is evidently one to be understood *cum grano salis*, seeing that the Ego, in fact, participates in the acting just as well as in the $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$. And for that very reason it is not correct simply to identify the conception of ν . with that, previously used, of the $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\omega$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$; the former expression is rather to be apprehended as the more exact, or as in some way limiting the latter: for there is no occasion, so far as Schmidt can see, to take the latter in another sense than it has at 2 Cor. iv. 16, where it denotes the life within in contrast to the outside. A comparison, moreover, of the passage just adduced with 1 Cor. v. 5 readily shows that the contrast of the inner and outer man coincides substantially (*sich sachlich deckt*) with that between π . and σ . (or $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$), and accordingly it will also be clear that, even on the assumption of a π . ascribed to man and falling under the conception of spirit when viewed in its unity, the choice of the designation in this case by ν . is sufficiently accounted for (*motivirte*) by the thought of Rom. vii. 14 ff.

There is the less reason for our placing the Apostle's anthropological terminology out of relation to his specific conception of the π ., that the conception of spirit is, as we convinced ourselves, contrasted in a quite general sense with that of the flesh. If the latter finds its essential quality (*Bestimmtheit*) in the element of the material, the spirit on the other hand denotes primarily the non-material, conceived of at the same time in a positive aspect as moving power, just as with the notion of material substance is associated that of being at rest. So far it may be said that the contrast of flesh and spirit is

essentially a metaphysical one ; but this does not exclude its becoming in a definite relation an anthropological one, since the same contrast, as it has just been generally characterised, evidently underlies the Biblical view of man. Holsten himself very correctly remarks that the dualism of spirit and matter in this strictly metaphysical form is not met with in Paul, inasmuch as with him in place of the latter comes the narrower conception of the flesh ; but, when he defines the contrast accordingly resulting simply as that between God and man, his view rests on presuppositions which Schmidt cannot regard as really proved. Holsten himself must admit that so far as π . denotes the non-material, the human ψ . falls under this as abstract generic notion, and that in this respect Paul certainly knows a "human-creaturely" π . No doubt he immediately adds that this latter has absolutely "nothing in common with the concrete π ., the $\tau\delta$ π ., this sole *reality* of the abstract generic conception"; but what at bottom is meant by this ? If, on the one hand, the immaterial element of human being falls under the general conception of spirit, and on the other hand the human π . is, as cannot rationally be denied, not less a concrete than the divine, how should it not then be likewise viewed as "a reality of the abstract generic conception"? or conversely, if the divine Spirit is the sole reality of the same, with what right is another thing likewise real subsumed under the same general conception ? It is surely not very probable that Paul should have on the one side restricted the sphere of the material to the bodily nature of man, but on the other side should have quite excluded the immaterial element of his being from the conception of spirit ; on the contrary, it is of itself very natural to seek the proximate basis for his peculiar view in the reality which that contrast, generally con-

ceived, has within human nature itself. By this Schmidt does not mean, indeed, that anywhere, where Paul contrasts flesh and spirit in the moral sphere, he would have the latter understood as the human : but there is everywhere meant either the general conception of spirit, or the concrete reality which it has in the *divine* π.

The grounds on which Schmidt conceives that the Apostle, looking to *reality*, could take little account of the human π., and the general conclusion to which he comes, are sufficiently indicated in the text (pp. 34-37).

III. DR. HERMANN LÜDEMANN.

The elaborate treatise, extending to 217 pages, published in 1872 by Dr. Lüdemann on the "Anthropology of the Apostle Paul and its place in his doctrinal system," discusses, first, the physical anthropology. He sets out from the division of human nature into an ἔξω ἄνθρωπος and an ἔσωθεν ἄνθρωπος, in 2 Cor. iv. 16, following it without asking, in the first instance, its warrant. The *outer* man embraces, 1st, the conceptions of σ. and ψ., the former being the material substratum of the earthly body, the latter the life animating it. Σ. occurs in the purely material sense in 1 Cor. xv. 39, 50, and 2 Cor. iii. 3. But it is not to be conceived as *materia bruta*, but as living, animated matter, which it is not necessary to explain, as Baur does, from the analogy of the ancient idea of matter. The σ. without a ψ. is no σ., and the ψ. is only conceivable within a σ. This σ. is susceptible of pain and pleasure (1. Cor. v. 5; 1 Cor. vii. 8). The close connection between σ. and ψ. is confirmed by their promiscuous use (identical sense of ψυχικός and σαρκικός). The use of the expression κατὰ σάρκα in

matters of descent rests on this primary sense (Rom. i. 3, etc.).

But with this restriction to bodily matter another use of σ . or ψ . conflicts, when they denote the *whole man*, particularly in the phrases $\pi\hat{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$ σ . and $\pi\hat{\alpha}\sigma\alpha$ ψ ., Hebraic turns of expression certainly used in the sense of "every one," but always from the connection employed of human nature in a state of subordination and humiliation. So, too, the formula σ . $\kappa\alpha\iota$ $\alpha\hat{\iota}\mu\alpha$ (Gal. i. 16) with the accessory sense of frailty. The sister-conception ψ . likewise denotes individual existence (1 Cor. xv. 45; Rom. xi. 3; 2 Cor. i. 23). To this Old Testament extension of meaning the Pauline usage attaches itself, according to which σ . denotes anything belonging to the natural mode of man's existence, but never without a certain purposed degrading connotation [*Beigeschmack*], e.g., Gal. iii. 3, Gal. vi. 12. This seems to carry us beyond the category of the $\xi\xi\omega$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$; and we must ask whether we can still follow it. But the remembrance of passages where it is decidedly confined to the body, as well as the consideration that it is used in classical Greek (though mostly in the plural $\alpha\hat{\iota}\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\epsilon\varsigma$), and that the conception σ . in later Greek is used with strict limitation to the body (as shown by Zeller), appear to require us to keep by this category, and to set aside for a time the Old Testament extension of the conception. And in this we are confirmed when we glance at another conception, that of $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$, which is used by Paul not as identical with σ ., but as denoting the form by assuming which the σ ., as substance, is in a position to constitute the human body.

That $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ resolves itself into bodily form is plain from its being applied entirely irrespective of any particular matter (1 Cor. xv. 35-50), where the pith of the proof for a resurrection-body lies in the fact set forth of diverse

bodily substances, and ultimately in the assertion of a celestial body-substance. $\Sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, thus used for bodies of quite opposite matter, has nothing to do with materiality. It is a form, into which any matter may enter, though, as verse 40 shows, the character of the matter is of essential influence on the shaping of the form. At 1 Cor. xii. 12 Paul defines the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ as unity in multiplicity—in short, under the conception of *organism*; and hence it is applied to social organisms, especially the Church. The teleological idea here is that of being the organ of action generally—so at 2 Cor. v. 10. The use of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ in sexual matters is noted (Rom. iv. 19; 1 Cor. vi. 13-20), and also, as form conditions appearance, its use to express "aspect" (2 Cor. x. 10; 1 Cor. v. 3).

The combination $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ is not (doubtless accidentally) carried out in the larger Epistles (it occurs at Col. ii. 11). But we find $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\ \psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$, which means the same, for it can only be so called as $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\ \sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$, and presupposes this formula. $\Sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ may be often employed instead of $\sigma.$, but $\sigma.$ can never come in place of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, for $\sigma.$ cannot express, or even include, the conception of form. . . .

When at 2 Cor. iv. 16 it is said of the "outer man" $\delta\iota\alpha\phi\theta\epsilon\iota\rho\acute{\epsilon}\tau\alpha\iota$, and this perishableness procures for man elsewhere the name $\phi\theta\alpha\rho\tau\acute{o}\varsigma\ \grave{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ (Rom. i. 23), so that the $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ as $\phi\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$ characterises it, it might appear as if we must revert to the view that $\sigma.$ is an expression for human nature generally, or, as Holsten puts it, for the conception of the finite. But when we recall the fact that the $\delta\iota\alpha\phi\theta\epsilon\iota\rho\acute{\epsilon}\tau\alpha\iota$ is expressly affirmed only of the $\xi\grave{\epsilon}\omega\ \grave{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$, it is clear that the element of finiteness and perishableness is in the first instance limited to the body, and, whatever may be the case with the Old Testament, in Paul's case where the $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ is pronounced perish-

able as matter (1 Cor. xv. 42, 50, 53, 54; Gal. vi. 8), the teaching seems strongly akin to the Greek or Hellenistic conception of the principle of matter, to which perishableness or non-being ($\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$) was ascribed. What, if the Hellenistic negativity of matter here appears? But it is alleged that all this separation of an $\xi\zeta\omega\ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ has with Paul no strict anthropological value. For at 2 Cor. iv. 16 he is speaking of the redeemed man, in whom an $\xi\sigma\omega$ and $\xi\zeta\omega\ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ may be distinguished; but in the natural man it has no place. We reply that there is mention of the $\xi\sigma\omega\ \alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ also at Rom. vii. 22; and there the discussion concerns not the redeemed, but the natural man, who is simply longing for redemption. What is the "inner man" there?

The expression at Rom. vii. 22 is interchanged with $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$, which must accordingly be a chief constituent of it. $N.$ denotes self-consciousness (1 Cor. xiv. 14), and thence all the mental activities in which it is presupposed, and which we comprehend under the term "understanding" (*Verstand*); the result of which is $\gamma\iota\gamma\nu\acute{\omega}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\iota\nu$ and $\epsilon\iota\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu\alpha\iota$, and its outcome the $\nu\acute{\omicron}\eta\mu\alpha$. It is in this respect a purely formal activity of the thinking mind, dealing with any contents at pleasure. It is primarily the faculty which distinguishes good and evil (Rom. xiv. 5, xii. 2). In Rom. vii. there is clearly ascribed to it the $\theta\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\epsilon\iota\nu$ itself; but for the practical attitude of will resting on judgment and appreciation and influencing life Paul uses $\phi\rho\nu\omicron\epsilon\iota\nu$, $\phi\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\eta\mu\alpha$, $\phi\rho\acute{\omicron}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$.

The conception $\kappa\alpha\rho\delta\acute{\iota}\alpha$, which recurs in the New Testament with the many-sided variety of aspects which it bears in the Old, and which Paul frequently makes use of, is to be arranged under the category of the inner man; and, one might say, constitutes with Paul the inner man directly as a whole. But, when from this it is

inferred (by Beck, Delitzsch and Weiss) that the ν . is to be assigned to the κ . as organ and classed under it, the prominence given to it by Paul would seem to preclude its being thus simply merged in the latter. The conception of κ . carries with it a reference to subjective feeling, to the concrete inner life of the Ego, and, when a cognitive faculty is associated with it, it is pre-eminently a receptive one, coincident with susceptibility. It is the seat of feeling also and of will. When κ . was too indefinite for the Apostle's purposes, he had recourse to ν .

With the terms ν . and κ . we have exhausted the materials that may be applied for a view of the $\epsilon\sigma\omega$ $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ without prejudging certain controversies. On these we have now to enter, and to discuss first how far that division of the inner and outer man in the Apostle's view is justified. Fritzsche and Meyer have long since pointed out that the formulae used by Paul for designating these two parts of human nature were naturalised at that time in a more or less similar form by the usage of the Platonic school. It seems hardly possible to avoid granting that Paul here appropriates the language of his historical environment. But in so speaking we do not yet decide whether he employs it in the spirit of its philosophic authors. In reality it is denied that he does so. And in fact when we recall those expressions which we meet with in Paul of the σ . or ψ . comprehending the whole man, and add to them the κ . which stands in so close relation to the σ . (2 Cor. iii. 3) that it cannot be substantially different from it, the separation of an $\epsilon\sigma\omega$ $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ in any such cardinal sense as that of Philo's statement as to the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$: $\delta\varsigma$, $\kappa\upsilon\rho\iota\omega\varsigma$ $\epsilon\iota\pi\epsilon\acute{\iota}\nu$, $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ $\epsilon\sigma\tau\acute{\iota}\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu$ $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omega$,¹ seems not practicable. Here we encounter the view of Holsten, who

¹ Philo, de Congressu, p. 533.

finds man's unity summed up in the notion σ . and its pure antithesis in the π .; and we are led to investigate the latter conception. This contrast is undeniably presented at Gal. vi. 8, and still more clearly at 1 Cor. xv. 40-53, in the various attributes assigned to π . and σ . respectively as the two poles of being. The π . is not merely called ζωοποιούν and identified with ζωή (Rom. viii. 2) but it is more precisely defined as π . Θεοῦ or Χριστοῦ. It belongs to the nature of God, and what is affirmed of God is affirmed of it, and conversely. Power and might are ascribed to it. And there belongs to it an outward nature, as is to be seen from the—it must be admitted—somewhat fluctuating use of the conception δόξα. On several occasions δόξα seems to denote a finer luminous matter (*Lichtmaterie*), which belongs to the π ., and of which the σώματα ἐπουράνια consist. . . . The π . is consequently at the same time expressive of a higher materiality.

The question, What is meant by this contrast of σ . and π . is answered by those who identify the σ . with human nature to the effect, that it is essentially the contrast between man and God; while from Holsten we get the answer, that it is the contrast of the non-material spiritual substance with the material sensuous substance, or in other words of the infinite and the finite. The former represents the *Jewish-religious* point of view; the latter that of *Hellenistic dualism*. In examining Holsten's position, we must first inquire: Can the speculative categories of Hellenism serve to express the religious categories of the Jewish consciousness thus offhand, so as to yield unity of thought? And, to answer this, we must attempt definitely to answer two further questions, What is dualism? and how is the *Jewish-religious* consciousness related to it? To the former it is replied that a dualis-

tic contrast can only be formed by two notions, which are at the same time co-ordinate, disjunct, contrarily opposed ; and illustrations of this dualism and of the difficulties attending the attempt to carry it out consistently are adduced from Plato and Philo. To the second it is replied that there is nothing corresponding to this dualism in the Jewish-religious consciousness. The absolutely transcendent place of power, which the Creator of the universe occupies for the Hebrew, precludes the latter from lighting on the idea of opposing to God any co-ordinate principle or contrary opposite. He feels himself indeed penetrated by the deepest sense of the inferiority of all that is finite in presence of the Exalted One, who has His throne in heaven ; but there is here no dualism. There is merely a contradictory contrast of the finite and the infinite, in which all "position" and activity fall to the latter, while the notion of the former never gets beyond the merely privative predicates of the frail, the weak, of complete or partial non-being. While in Hellenism man consists of a material element and a spiritual akin to the divine, which are dualistically separated, and are only brought to agree at the expense of one of them, in the Old Testament man is a unity of spirit and body, ranking with the finite under the designation *basar*, sometimes in intercourse with the divine infinite and receiving the divine revelation (Ps. xvi. 9, lxiii. 2, lxv. 3 ; Is. xi. 5, lxvi. 23, 24 ; Joel iii. 1), sometimes—with emphatic extension of this designation, so as to embrace his whole being—in a relation of humblest subordination to the Deity (Jer. xvii. 5 ; Deut. v. 23 ; Ps. lxxviii. 39 ; Is. xi. 6, xvi. 16). It is clear therefore that those two general contrasts—the Hebrew of infinite and finite and the Hellenistic of spirit and matter—do not, and cannot, coincide. Holsten's view of the σ . is

neither Jewish nor Hellenistic—not Jewish, for the Old Testament *basar* may never be taken so literally as to denote man as a *purely material* unity ; not Hellenistic, for the Hellenistic category of σ . does not profess at all to denote the whole of human nature, and to merge it as a whole in dualistic contrast to the pneumatic-divine, but confines itself only to the body—man's material element.

But, while we cannot accept Holsten's definitions, the discussion has perhaps paved the way to our understanding the Apostle's position. There may be conceived, alongside of a Judaism but slightly brought into contact with Hellenism, a third relation of the two spheres of consciousness as possible, under which Hellenistic dualism may have so penetrated into a consciousness originally purely Jewish, that within the framework of Jewish conceptions there is evolved a really *contrary* contrast, and the religious contrast of the finite and infinite undergoes dualistic remodelling and consolidation (*sich dualistisch umbildet und verfestigt*), with which at the same time there must emerge a dualistic element in the anthropology. In that case the Hellenistic categories would never be met with quite pure, but partly *alongside* of a purely Jewish way of looking at things, partly *mixed* with the Jewish categories, perhaps even becoming advanced in opposition to them and thereupon in their consequences more and more abandoning (*aufhebend und durchbrechend*) that basis of Jewish consciousness that at first appeared so pure. Is not just such a form of consciousness apparent in the Paulinism of the four Epistles ?

In the sense, laid down at the outset, of σ . as man and finiteness we have already recognised an element of the Old Testament religious view. Paul at times actually ex-

presses the sense of the inferiority of all that is human by the contrast of σ . and π . (Gal. i. 11, 16 ; Gal. ii. 17—Rom. iii. 20 ; 1 Cor. i. 29 expressly, quite in the Old Testament manner, by ἐνώπιον αὐτοῦ). Reverting to the proper signification of σ ., we find it set overagainst π . at Rom. i. 3, 4 ; ii. 28, 29 ; also at Rom. ix. 27 ; 1 Cor. ix. 11 ; 2 Cor. x. 4. Gal. iv. 23, 29. We find the contrast advancing to the sense of what is human generally after the analogy of 1 Cor. ii. 5 (σοφία ἀνθρώπων—δύναμις θεοῦ, comp. verse 13) ; possibly also 2 Cor. i. 12 (σοφία σαρκική—χάρις θεοῦ), although here another point of view may emerge. We may likewise see this contrast in 2 Cor. iii. 6 (γράμμα—πνεῦμα) ; and σ . stands in a more comprehensive signification as a whole aggregate of relations of man's outward life (the Mosaic law) overagainst π . at Gal. iii. 3. Doubtless to some extent the Old Testament contrast underlies the passage 1 Cor. xv. 34 ff. But a characteristic element of this passage lies in the predicates almost throughout purely privative—expressing passive weakness—that are assigned to the finite overagainst the πνευματικόν, and appear to denote the nature of the ἄνθρωπος χοϊκός—of the ψ . ζῶσα as respects its unity as a whole. For that very reason a dualism in the proper sense cannot be formed from these predicates, for the σ . as φθορά, ἀτιμία, ἀσθένεια, does not attain to life or reality as confronting the transcendent glory and absolute reality of the π . But the intentional accumulation of opposite attributes, and the strict carrying out of the contrast through all its elements points, in connection with the expressed doctrinometaphysical and physical character of this section, decidedly to the conclusion that that Old Testament religious contrast is here on the eve of becoming consolidated into a really doctrinal dualism. The impression of such

a metamorphosis is strengthened, when we observe that the pith of the argument lies in the proof of differences of *matter*, and that, while at verse 45, on the basis of a Biblical citation, the whole nature of man is adduced as proof, at verse 50 the expression $\sigma.$ και $\alpha\lambda\mu\alpha$, used at Gal. i. 16 of man generally, sinks quite to the sphere of the mere material side of his being. And the attention here given to $\sigma.$ as mere matter in contrast to $\pi.$ leads us to repeat the question, Whether the purely physical use of the word, claimed for it at the outset, is not much more fitted to place the Pauline conception of $\sigma.$ in analogy with the Hellenistico-speculative dualistic category of matter, than the other, embracing emphatically after Old Testament usage the whole man, with which Holsten makes the attempt. It will lend support to such an attempt, if we find passages where the $\sigma.$ emerges as an independent *dualistic* principle, as in Rom. viii. 6, where the $\phi\rho\acute{o}\nu\eta\mu\alpha$, the goal of an *active effort* of the $\sigma.$, is $\theta\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\tau\omicron\varsigma$; and Gal. v. 13, 17 (the passage where, be it observed, this conception of the $\sigma.$ *first appears in Paul and in Christian literature*) where $\sigma.$ and $\pi.$ are designated as principles, which $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\eta\lambda\omicron\iota\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\tau\acute{\iota}\kappa\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha\iota.$ In point of fact, there are not a few instances where the conception of $\sigma.$ is restricted and does not cover the whole man, such as those where man distinguishes himself *as such* from his $\sigma.$, reckons it not so much his Ego as his possession, speaks of it as his (Rom. vi. 19; vii. 18; xiii. 14; 2 Cor. vii. 5; Gal. iv. 14; vi. 13), where the $\sigma.$ appears as the *matter* merely of the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$, and this $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$ is so far from constituting man's proper nature, that it appears as the "outer man" whose $\delta\iota\alpha\phi\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\rho\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ does not hinder the renewal of the "inner man," and as a mere *tabernacle* to be left, a dress to be put off, or where the cry is for deliverance from the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ $\tau\omicron\upsilon$ $\theta\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omicron\nu$ (Rom. vii. 24). Such a

separation of the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος from the ἔξω ἄνθρωπος. must consequently be possible; and human nature cannot be simply coincident with the σ. as sensuous-material substance.

After criticising acutely the idea of Holsten that Paul, when entering, as in the passages quoted, on dichotomous distinctions, simply shares the view of his time as to a purely external relation of the spirit to the body, and after showing that Paul's view is not to be identified either with the Platonic Hellenism of Philo, who presents purely the dualism of spirit and matter, or with the position of the Palestinian Jews, who, so far from sharing Paul's view of the fleshly body as a *non-constituent* element in human nature, treat it as so essential that man is not to be conceived of without it, Lüdemann comes to the conclusion that Paul does not simply share the view of his time, but occupies a peculiar position ranging him on the side of Hellenism rather than of Judaism. While Paul keeps on Jewish ground as to his use of π., he employs σ. sometimes in the wider Jewish conception as equivalent to "man," sometimes in the narrower Greek sense of the earthly matter of his body. The σῶμα σαρκός is separable from man himself, and the category of the ἔξω ἄνθρωπος is thus restored.

But if that is so, how does it stand with the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος as to its more precise definition? and in what way is the subject proper of man to be sought in it? This question is not cleared up by the previous discussion of ν. and κ., which are not so much *parts* as organs and functions of the spirit; we have to inquire, according to Paul's way of thinking, after a real *subject* of the inner man, which acts in and through these. Ψ., which has been suggested for this purpose, cannot be taken, for while it occasionally has—particularly in the phrase πᾶσα

ψ.—the sense of the personality of man corresponding to the wider sense of σ., it elsewhere restricts itself, like the latter, to the material-animate side of human nature; and its indissoluble connection with σ. is a sufficient reason for giving to it, as regards its idea, an essentially external position towards human nature proper—a view confirmed by the synonymous use of ψυχικός and σαρκικός. The substance of the ἔσω ἄνθρωπος is to be found in that τὸ π. ἄνθρώπου which the Apostle brings clearly enough forward at 1 Cor. ii. 11, and which, in his view, forms the contrast to σῶμα in 1 Cor. v. 3; 2 Cor. vii. 34. Lüdemann cannot accept the view of Krumm and Delitzsch, which assigns to the π. the ν. as organ of cognition, and the κ. as organ of feeling. He cannot see how one and the same conception can be taken now as the mind itself, now as one of the mental faculties. To Holsten's declaration that "Paul distinguishes yet a higher element in human nature, an 'inner man' opposed to the 'outer,'" he replies that it is not easy to see how a "higher element" can belong to man who, by Holsten's account, is essentially only σ.; or how the ν., if it is only an organ of the σ.-substance, can take up an attitude of contrast to it, as Holsten holds it to do; or how it can even be in a position to establish the fact of its impotence overagainst the σ., if it *essentially* and indissolubly belongs to it. The very possibility of a renewal of the ν., to which Holsten points as a main ground for the distinction of ν. from π. Θεοῦ, would rather make good the essential diversity of the ν. from the σ. The very concession of distinctions such as Holsten makes breaks up with the sharpness of a wedge that unity of the σ. he had formerly laid down. He cannot accede to Holsten's interpretation of the π. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου in 1 Cor. ii. 11 as equivalent to the π. τοῦ κόσμου in verse 12, which Paul expressly *denies having re-*

ceived, or of the latter as coincident with the ψ ., which Holsten elsewhere treats as a purely physical conception, but here treats as something non-material, pneumatic! He infers from 1 Cor. v. 5: $\dot{\iota}\nu\alpha\ \tau\acute{o}\ \pi.\ \sigma\omega\theta\eta\grave{\iota}$, that it is not to be identified with the divine π ., for $\acute{\alpha}\phi\theta\alpha\rho\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$ does not belong to it in virtue of its nature—if it still needs to be saved, it may also perish—nor is it to be associated as respects its nature with $\phi\theta\omicron\rho\acute{\alpha}$, for it may be saved.

If it be asked, Whether this π . belongs to the side of σ . or of π . $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$, he answers: in respect of nature to neither of them. This π . of man—which has its outward manifestation in the $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$ as the *form* for opposite contents of substance, and its cognitive (*gegenständliches*) consciousness in the ν . as the *form* for opposite contents of knowledge, and lastly its reflective (*zuständliches*) consciousness in the κ . as the *form* for opposite contents of experience—this π . must *itself* be a substance so purely capable of being determined and variously affected that we cannot wonder, when, under the influence of a stronger substance, it, as it were, disappears from our view. Yet it is a necessary element for connecting the conceptions of the anthropology. Only under the supposition of this π . $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omicron\nu$ is it possible to vindicate for man, in Paul, a spiritual (*geistigen*) character, and yet withal, 1, to leave the π . $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$, as absolute spiritual substance, in its transcendence; 2, to take the σ . in contradistinction to it quite according to its literal sense as matter of the body; 3, really to uphold the categories $\sigma\hat{\omega}\mu\alpha$, ν ., κ ., as forms for different contents, not essentially bound to the σ . It appears therefore that this conception, which brings unity and fixity into the whole system, is directly required by it, and would need to be hypothetically supplied to the Apostle, if he had not himself presented it with such clearness as is desirable.

Looking back, we see in the anthropology the result of Hellenistic influence operating on an originally Jewish consciousness, and manifested in the evolving of two conceptions, that of the $\nu.$, and that of the $\sigma.$ as bodily matter. The abiding basis of the Jewish view manifests itself, (1) in that, although fleshliness is recognised as not constitutive for human nature, yet corporeality ($\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$) is still retained as constitutive, as necessary for the existence of the $\pi.$ $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\nu$, (2) in that we do not reach the Platonic-Hellenistic conception of the human mind as a $\pi.$ $\theta\epsilon\acute{\iota}\omicron\nu$ so as to get an absolute dualism within human nature, but the dualistic contrast to the $\sigma.$ -matter is only found in the $\pi.$ $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$. This anthropology, with its $\pi.$ $\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\nu$ standing in need as well as capable of redemption in the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\acute{o}\varsigma$, is *out and out* dichotomous, and thereby no longer Jewish; but not dualistic, and thereby not yet Hellenistic. It is the first *Christian* anthropology.

The second part is entitled the Ethical Anthropology. Here the conceptions of $\sigma.$ and $\pi.$ take upon them the marks of *good* and *evil*, and we encounter a conflict between the two principles—which is presented, so far as the individual is concerned, in the utterance Gal. v. 17: “The flesh lusteth against the Spirit” and, so far as history is concerned, in the two phases or periods, 1 Cor. xv. 46: $\pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron\nu$ $\tau\acute{o}$ $\psi\upsilon\chi\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$, $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\epsilon\iota\tau\alpha$ $\tau\acute{o}$ $\pi\nu\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$. The first section treats of “the $\sigma.$ as principle of sin, and its relation to the conceptions $\psi.$ and $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$.” Here we must hold strictly by the physical conception in connection with the mark of $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$ that is now associated with it (Rom. vii. 18: “sin dwells in my flesh”; vii. 14: $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\iota\nu\omicron\varsigma$, consisting in *substance* of flesh—from which seemingly mere physical basis sin is derived, for the $\pi\epsilon\pi\rho\alpha\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omicron\varsigma$ $\upsilon\pi\acute{o}$ $\tau\eta\nu$ $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$ is placed as quite synonymous by its side). Sin dwells in the flesh with a necessity of

natural law (νόμος, vii. 21, 23, 25). The views of Julius Müller, Ernesti, and Weiss, are reviewed and criticised at considerable length. If σ . by itself denoted a tendency of life (*Lebensrichtung*), κατὰ σάρκα περιπατεῖν would mean "to take the direction of a direction," and Rom. vii. 14 would be a tautology. Such expressions as: "we are debtors to the flesh to live according to the flesh" (Rom. viii. 12), "the flesh lusteth," has ἐπιθυμίας and θελήματα (vi. 12, 13, 14; Gal. v. 16, 17), εἰς ἀφόρμην τῆ σαρκί (Gal. v. 13), clearly present the σ . as an independent operative principle, not as a mere "tendency of life." The objection, that some of the ἔργα τῆς σαρκός in Gal. v. 17 f. have absolutely nothing to do with the flesh as "sensuousness," is met by pointing out the ambiguity of the latter expression, which sometimes is used to denote the bodily, earthly-material existence, sometimes to signify a direction of the will and the affections to the sensuous and its needs. We do not need to refer all sins as such to sensuous desire; for the impulses of the σ . make their way throughout the ν . and κ .; and the classification of the works of the flesh given by Meyer admits of the whole being traced either to the purely bodily desire of the σ ., or to the ν . τῆς σαρκός (sins of spiritual aberration—idolatry, witchcraft), or to the κ . enslaved by the σ . (ἐχθραὶ . . . φόνοι). Man thus determined by the σ . is filled throughout, saturated, by its quality. He is σαρκικός, ψυχικός; and the conception "man" may be interchanged simply with σ ., although it may at times be matter of doubt whether it is the characteristic of the Old Testament σ . *passive weakness*, that is predominant, or that of the Hellenistico-dualistic, *sinful energy*. The two modes of view run into one another, especially in the Epistles to the Corinthians. Holsten holds the connection of the σ . with ἀμ. to be essential

and incapable of being done away, so that Weiss could use no simpler argument against him than the question, If $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$ is essential to the $\sigma.$ as the whole human nature in itself, where remains for Paul the possibility of a redemption of man from sin? Lüdemann holds the $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, or the saturation of human nature with the quality of the $\sigma.$, as the *de facto* result of the operation of that spontaneous sin-principle; but it is not in his judgment *essential*, or *constitutive* for the idea of man according to Paul. The $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omega$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ is a domain only occupied by sin, only conquered, and to be taken from it again. Rom. vii. shows how the $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\omega$ $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ comes to be awakened by the $\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\varsigma$ $\pi\nu\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$. The $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ —the self-consciousness—appears in that classic passage so at variance with the $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$ in the $\sigma.$ that $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$ cannot *essentially* have its seat in the $\nu.$ —which wills it not, yea, rather hates it—but only in the $\sigma.$ Now, as man has not given to himself the $\sigma.$, but has got it as an appointed condition of his existence, it follows that sin is given to him without his own action. The conception of $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$ is therefore to be understood not subjectively of a direction of the human will, but *objectively* of a *quality* (*Beschaffenheit*) of man's earthly nature. . . . The $\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\varsigma$ is, as it were, the wedge driven into the joints of human nature, and breaking up the apparent unity of the $\acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$. The exposition of this subject fits into the frame-work of Rom. vii. 7—viii. 30. The pure objectivity of the $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$ in human nature is required by the conception of $\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\varsigma$, and is apparent from the expressions that indicate how sin is subjectivised in man by the law—a thought which is formulated concisely in Rom. iii. 20: $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}$ $\gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$ $\nu\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\nu$ $\acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota\gamma\gamma\omega\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\iota\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$. The key-note of the section is Rom. vii. 9: $\acute{\eta}$ $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$ $\nu\epsilon\kappa\rho\acute{\alpha}$. . . $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\theta\omicron\upsilon\sigma\eta\varsigma$ $\delta\acute{\epsilon}$ $\tau\eta\varsigma$ $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\tau\omicron\lambda\eta\varsigma$ $\acute{\eta}$ $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$ $\acute{\alpha}$ $\nu\acute{\epsilon}\zeta\eta\sigma\epsilon\nu$. Man comes to know sin, so soon as it has

through the ἐντολή come to consciousness and by its reaction against the commandment presented itself as παράβασις. Paul does not expressly reflect on the free decision of will, which for us constitutes sin, wherein we regard the element of evil design as essential. Objectively looked at, he indeed very decidedly denies it in Rom. vii.; but he does not propose to himself the question as a problem proper. ἄμ. does not mean either sin in our sense, or "sinfulness" as only the potential ground of sin; it embraces completely the element of actuality, and corresponds most nearly to our notion of "evil." The maintenance of the pure objectivity of ἄμ. gives the key to Rom. vii. . . . The entire equality of nature of the first and of all other men is clearly enough intimated by 1 Cor. xv. 45 ff. where the first man is described as mere ψ. ζῶσα and as χοϊκός, and then it is said (verse 48): οἶος ὁ χοϊκός, τοιοῦτοι οἱ χοϊκοί, which is to be regarded as an axiom of the Pauline theology. Need we supplement Rom. vii. from Rom. v. 12 ff.? "We believe that we do not go beyond the cycle of Pauline thought, when we conceive of the matter thus: Upon the creation of man, when the χοῦς was combined with the πνοή ζωῆς, the σ. with the ψ. came at once into existence. Along with it immediately emerged the fact, that ἡ ἄμ. εἰσῆλθε εἰς τὸν κόσμον. But this is not the only mode of the εἰσῆλθε. For this objective ἄμ.—(νεκρά)—'ἀνέζησεν' already in the first man. Already here there was introduced a positive command which is, (1) ἐπίγνωσις τῆς ἄμ., (2) δύναμις τῆς ἄμ. Therefore, ἡ ἄμ. κατειργάσατο τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, and—because οὐ οὐκ ἔστι νόμος, οὐδὲ παράβασις—there arose, just because a law was there, already in Adam the παράβασις, as the Apostle sharply brings out at v. 14. We have here exactly the same state of things as at vii. 7-13."

The objectivity of the $\acute{\alpha}\mu$. is even in Adam the causal ground of his παράβασις . Paul recognises as an axiom the *natural* (not merely positive-legal) connection of death with sin, which underlies the threat of the law and the feeling thereby produced in the subject of guilt and fear of punishment. . . . The doctrine of a *status integritatis* is then discussed, and it is held improbable that Paul could have adopted such a view of the fall as we find in the Wisdom of Solomon and Philo, linked as it is in their case with anthropological premisses which are foreign to him. That Paul did not accept the intervention of the devil, is inferred from a comparison of Rom. v. 12 with Wisd. ii. 24, where "the verbal accord is in part so striking (*der Wortlaut so ähnlich*) that the variation can only be intentional." Paul's anthropological speculation has purposely taken a way of its own. The first man was like the rest; in him too was posited from the first the σ . with the $\acute{\alpha}\mu$. Returning to Rom. vii. it is held that in the state of things presented in verses 14-24 the παραβάσεις continue still, just as they broke out at verse 9, and were full-blown in verse 13. But the inward conditions of the παράβασις are no longer the same as in 7-13. The process here described passes through two stages, in the former of which the $\nu\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ has the better knowledge, while in the second it has this as well as also the better will. We may describe as the two poles of this development the οὐκ ἔγνω and οὐκ ᾔδειν of verse 7 on the one hand, and the οὐ θέλω of verse 16 on the other. The process may be called the gradual (*successive*) emancipation of the ν . from the σ . It is characteristic of this that the Apostle at vii. 14 does not use σαρκικός , but σάρκινος . The former is here a standpoint already transcended. It was done away with the ceasing of the οὐκ ᾔδειν . The ν . is already awakened and discerns the

ground of its death-suffering more clearly in the sarkic quality which by nature attaches to its body. But this emancipation as only affecting the *knowing* and *willing* of the ἔσω ἄνθρ. remains here in the first instance a purely inner fact; it does not extend to action; it cannot yet attain to the καλόν. The νόμος as πνευματικός possessed the power, and had the task, of thus awakening the ν., estranging it from the σ. and filling it with hatred towards its bondage. But although the better willing of the ν. was already an effect of the pneumatic-divine factor that had appeared in the law, man could not accomplish more by its aid. For the law was only a preliminary manifestation of the Spirit of God, not yet the divine π. itself; it could not introduce the period of the πνευματικόν, but could only pave its way. The σ. was the hindrance weakening the law; the σ. must be *removed*. The law could go no further; it was weak through the σ. But the Apostle, before proceeding to ch. viii. which deals with this topic, and the relief of which he partially anticipates in vii. 24, recapitulates calmly the result of ch. vii. in the 25th verse.

The anthropological result of ch. vii. is that the ἔσω ἄνθρ. remains such an entity (*Wesenheit*) as was formerly indicated, in itself quite void of contents, but fitted to receive any determining influence. Lüdemann does not share the views of those who from different standpoints see in Rom. vii. a proof of the originally good character of the ν. (Baur, Beck, Usteri). The distinctions *within* man, which vanished for us in the ἄνθρ. σαρκικός, are now brought out in all their sharpness of relief by the intervention of the law and the thereby accomplished severance of the ἔσω ἄνθρ. from the σ. For the dualistic formula by which Paul here expresses the struggles of the moral consciousness he was indebted to Hellenism. We find,

especially in Philo, the σ . used just as Paul brings it in at Rom. vii. No doubt Philo is not fond of using the word σ .—making use rather of $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, or $\tau\grave{\alpha}$ $\pi\alpha\theta\eta$, $\eta\delta\omicron\nu\alpha\iota$, $\epsilon\pi\iota\theta\upsilon\mu\iota\alpha\iota$. It is comparatively seldom that he employs it of his own motion; he uses it mostly when he gets it given to his hand by the Old Testament text. But, so far as it appears, it has the same twofold function as with Paul, of oppressing and blunting the $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ in its powers, and of stifling and corrupting the moral consciousness. The points of analogy and difference between Paul and Philo in this respect are reviewed. . . . In ch. viii. the $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$ $\pi\nu\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$ gives place to the π . itself, which Paul designates as $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\iota\omicron\nu$, and which liberates man from the dominion of the σ . The human π . by virtue of its neutral formal nature on the one hand, and of its belongings to the genus π . on the other, is capable of receiving the divine π . We have already seen a pneumatic element, the $\nu\omicron\mu\omicron\varsigma$, enter into the human mind. So man cannot well be left under the σ .; he must be saved from death and sin. And this could not be done more effectually than by the π . $\zeta\omega\sigma\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu}$ itself. We have first to ask in what way and form the π . enters into the development of human history.

In the vision at Damascus God had shone into the Apostle's heart to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. The person, death, resurrection, and existence in glory of Jesus were the problems that presented themselves to the speculation of the Apostle. The following is a summary of the results of this speculation. That in the mission of Jesus, culminating in his death and resurrection, a heavenly factor had come into human history, was plain. Of what nature? First of all, a pneumatic factor, as the law had been, but a more powerfully effective embodiment of the

pneumatic principle, yea, this very principle concentrated in a pneumatic person. As such, the Christ who appeared on earth as Jesus had already pre-existed in heaven, with God, from the beginning of the ages. Hence he is the immediate image of God (2 Cor. iv. 4), for, like God, he is π . (Rom. viii. 9, 10). God created him as such, when He after His own image created that man (Gen. i. 26) who, according to 1 Cor. xv. 45, ἐγένετο εἰς π . ζωοποιουῦν. Paul there names him after his emergence in history—in which not the pneumatic but the psychic is first,—the ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ. But in himself he must have preceded his counterpart, the πρώτος Ἀδάμ, who became only ψ . ζῶσα, for the principle of verse 46 cannot possibly—even apart from history—hold absolutely, and τὸ ψυχικόν be posited as first being generally. He was opposed in his whole nature to the earthly Adam. . . . This ἀνθρ. ἐπουράνιος as εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ created εἰς π . ζωοποιουῦν is in virtue of this, his essential equality with God, the υἱὸς Θεοῦ (Gal. ii. 20, *al.*), organ of the creation for God in the beginning (1 Cor. viii. 6), and taking part in the gracious guidance of Israel (1 Cor. x. 1). This heavenly person was ὁ Χριστός, an expression which Paul uses throughout as a proper name. All this, therefore, Christ was already before he came down from heaven to become man and inaugurate the new period of the πνευματικόν.

When he had become “man,” he had a σῶμα σαρκός in which, instead of the π . ἀνθρώπου in other men, there dwelt the π . Θεοῦ, and this formed the substance of its inner nature, the proper subject of His personality. In that σ . of course the ψ ., the sensuous life, was included. . . . But had Jesus Christ with the σ . also ἀμ. ? So far as Rom. viii. 3 is concerned, the question turns on the import of ὁμοίωμα. Is it “similarity” admitting a

percentage of dissimilarity? or is it "likeness"? The result of a careful investigation of the formation and Pauline use of the word gives as its meaning "copy" (*Nachbildung*); and this meaning is to be retained here: "God sent His Son in a copy of sin-flesh." If we ask why he does not say merely *ἐν σαρκὶ ἁμ.*, the answer is simple. In the sin-flesh of humanity, the common characteristic of the *χοϊκοί*, the pneumatic celestial man could not at once have a share. If he was to appear in a body of such matter, the matter had to be, as it were, formed anew for him in accordance with the extant original of sinful flesh. If this matter was really to be the same as that of mankind—and this was inevitably necessary—it had to be a *ὁμοίωμα*, a *copy or repetition* of it. . . . If it is asked how we have to conceive the existence of *ἁμ.* in Christ according to Paul, we reply that *ἁμ.* is an objective quality of the flesh-substance. This latter, because living, is not merely habitually, but actually sinful, where it does not find within its sphere of operation an opposing principle to counterbalance it. In man's case it dominates the *π. ἀνθρώπου*, at first without its knowledge, after the intervention of the law with its knowledge, as producing *παράβασις*. But in Christ, instead of the *π. ἀνθρ.*, there was the *π. Θεου*, in which the *σ.* from the outset encountered a principle, which was a match for it and must during Christ's earthly life have, as it were, paralysed it and kept it in a fettered state. In Him *παράβασις* could not occur, because their real ground, the *ἁμ.*, lacked operative power. In this case it simply remained in part objective, and in part mere habitual quality of the *σ.* But as such it could not be wanting, if Christ was to be really incarnate.

The object for which Christ assumed the *σ. αμ.* was (Rom. viii. 3) that God might thereby "condemn sin

in the flesh," that he might in the bodily death of Christ annihilate the $\acute{\alpha}\mu.$ in and with the $\sigma.$, and thereby liberate the $\nu.$ That the reference here is to the death of Christ, is obvious from other passages connecting this destruction and liberation with the passion of Jesus (Rom. vi. 10 ; vii. 4 ; 1 Cor. v. 7, *al.*), and from the $\pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ = "sin-offering," subjoined. The passage could not be understood, if Christ's flesh were not the same as that in which sin is condemned, The blow which is now to light on the $\sigma.$ would fall *beside* it, if Christ had not had a real and true $\sigma.\ \acute{\alpha}\mu.$ If Christ, by special arrangement ($\acute{\omicron}\mu\omicron\acute{\iota}\omega\mu\alpha$), shares in the human $\sigma.$, and thereby the complex unity of that $\sigma.$ is fatally struck at one point, its paralysis in all its parts can only be a question of time. This effect of the bodily death of Christ presupposes his pre-existence as $\pi.\ \zeta\omega\omicron\pi\omicron\iota\omicron\upsilon\nu$; and the continued existence of the $\pi.$ enclosed in that annihilated $\sigma.$, and its victory over the latter, are made apparent by the *resurrection*, which is fundamentally important as the necessary correlate to Christ's death.

The next question is, How does what is objectively accomplished in Christ's death and resurrection obtain effect for the individual human subject enslaved by the $\sigma.$? Every one will have the answer on his tongue: by $\pi\acute{\iota}\sigma\tau\iota\varsigma$; but the Apostle puts baptism *foremost* (Rom. vi. 3. ff.). So intimate is the union of the baptized with Christ that it appears to fall almost nothing short of a real identification. The connection is such that what has taken place in Christ's case (*an Christo*) is *eo ipso* accomplished also in the case of the baptized. The old man, the $\sigma.$, shares in the crucifixion, and the $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\mu.$ of the baptized is thereby removed, cancelled. So real and certain a thing for the Apostle is this putting to death of the $\sigma.$, that it, and it only, is to him the

guarantee for the possibility and reality of a moral renewal. Many expositors here interpret Paul as speaking "figuratively." Certainly he cannot be here speaking of bodily death, but he speaks of a death which for him *has not in the least a less reality*, namely of the death of the σ . as the sinful principle in man.

As an immediate postulate of the dying with Christ, the Apostle designates the rising with Him (Rom. vi. 5). But while we see a real ground for the dying, we as yet lack it in an equal measure for the rising. Looking to Rom. vii. 25, a positive change is not *eo ipso* involved in the negative abeyance of the σ . With the abeyance of the σ . there remains only the ν ., and, considering its want of independence, it is very doubtful whether from itself there would issue a vigorous action in place of the previous weak *συνήδευθαι*. In fact, a new *ἀγεσθαι* is needed to impel the human subject into the new path. By baptism we become one with Christ, *i.e.*, with the π . *ζωοποιούν* itself. This π . has accordingly entered into believers, and effects in them the rising, just as in Christ himself it rose from the dead. At Rom. viii. 2 this new power is presented as the *law* (that is, the compelling necessity) of the "*spirit of life*," delivering from the compulsory service of sin, and enabling man to fulfil the *δικαίωμα τοῦ νόμου*. At Rom. viii. 4-8 the two principles and their working are contrasted; and still more clearly as regards their ethical sides, *ἀμ.* and *δικαιοσύνη*, at Rom. vi. 18-23.

How quite objectively the π . is present in man, without losing its self-subsistent nature, may be seen from such passages as Rom. viii. 9, 1 Cor. iii. 16, where the Spirit is presented as *dwelling in believers*—*ὄντως* 1 Cor. xiv. 25—and other passages where the Spirit is spoken of as *given and received*. As this π . is also the π . *Χριστοῦ*, and

indeed the Χριστός himself, the expressions as to “putting on Christ” (Gal. iii. 27) and “Christ in man” (2 Cor. xiii. 3) refer to this; and in connection therewith the religious relation to the risen One as “Lord” and the most frequent designation of Him as Χριστός find their explanation. The π. is now the element “in which” all takes place. Man is πνευματικός, and therewith δίκαιος, ἅγιος; and the more precise result of its presence is specified at Rom. viii. 10: “the body is dead on account of sin, but the spirit is life on account of righteousness,” where the first effect is the putting to death of the σ., for σῶμα stands here as including the latter; and the second is the putting of life into the π., which must be taken of the π. ἀνθρώπου, partly because of the *hypothetical* ascription to it of the predicate ζώη—which would not be intelligible were the divine π. the subject—partly because of the correlative σῶμα.

The abstract-dogmatic description of the pneumatic redeemed man briefly runs thus: τὸ σῶμα (ἁμαρτίας) νεκρόν, τὸ πνευῆ ζώη. But how stands the matter in real life? How is the σῶμα as νεκρόν to be reconciled with the σῶματα θνητά (so *not yet* dead) of verse 11, and with the fact that after all in verse 13 the mortifying the works of the body is apparently left to the subject himself? Before we can answer these questions, we must determine more exactly the sense of the “π. ζώη.” If π. in verse 10 is the human spirit, may it be so likewise in verse 13, or is it the divine Spirit that is there referred to? Lüdemann decides in favour of the latter; but it is necessary to avoid arbitrariness, and the following criteria are suggested for determining whether in the passages discussed by Holsten the reference is to the divine or to the human π.:—(1) Where something is conferred on, or wished for, the π., which the divine

already from its nature has, or where something befalls the $\pi.$, for which the divine has naturally no place, this $\pi.$ is always the human. This rules such passages as 1 Cor. vii. 34; 2 Cor. vii. 1; Gal. vi. 18; Rom. xii. 11. (2) When $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ and $\pi.$ are in juxtaposition, and $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ is simply to be understood of the human body as it appears, the $\pi.$ is the human. So at 1 Cor. v. 3, 4, and also 1 Cor. vii. 34, as above. (3) If again $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ stands pregnantly—that is, of the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha\rho\tau\acute{\iota}\alpha\varsigma$ or $\sigma\alpha\rho\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$ — $\pi.$, unless something intervene to hinder it, is the divine. So at Rom. viii. 13. Rom. viii. 10 is an exception on account of the hypothetical attribution of the $\zeta\omega\acute{\eta}$. Contrasted with $\sigma.$, $\pi.$ is always the divine, except at 1 Cor. v. 5; 2 Cor. vii. 1. At other passages discussed by Holsten, we see with him the divine $\pi.$, with the exception of Rom. viii. 16, where Holsten thinks the $\pi.$ $\acute{\eta}\mu\omega\acute{\nu}$ is just the $\pi.$ $\nu\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$ of verse 15; but how can witness be first borne to this $\pi.$, that we are sons? And by whom? By itself? If verse 16 is clearly only epexegetis of verse 15, so that $\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\acute{\alpha}\beta\epsilon\tau\epsilon$ is explained by $\sigma\upsilon\mu\mu\alpha\rho\tau\upsilon\rho\epsilon\acute{\iota}$, and the $\pi.$ $\nu\acute{\iota}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\varsigma$ by $\alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{\omicron}$ $\tau\acute{\omicron}$ $\pi.$, it only remains for $\pi.$ $\acute{\eta}\mu\omega\acute{\nu}$ to be epexegetis of $\acute{\eta}\mu\epsilon\acute{\iota}\varsigma$. This passage gives us a glimpse into the life of the $\pi\nu\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omicron}\varsigma$, showing that an intercourse subsists between his self-consciousness and a divine element in him, of which, as a Christian, he is aware; and it receives confirmation from Rom. viii. 26, and illustration from 1 Cor. xiv. in the distinction between the $\lambda\alpha\lambda\acute{\omega}\nu$ $\gamma\lambda\acute{\omega}\sigma\sigma\alpha\iota\varsigma$, in whom the divine $\pi.$ is alone active while the $\nu.$ is quiescent ($\acute{\alpha}\kappa\alpha\rho\pi\omicron\varsigma$), and the $\pi\rho\omicron\phi\eta\tau\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\omega\acute{\nu}$, who also acts under the influence of the $\pi.$, but maintains his state of reflective consciousness.

The effect of the immanence of the $\pi.$ $\Theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$ in the human $\pi.$ appears as gradual heightening of the powers of

the latter in different ways—of the powers of thought, in an ἀνακαίνωσις τοῦ νοῦς εἰς τὸ δοκιμάζειν τι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ (Rom. xii. 2), the effects of which are expressed by γνῶσις, λόγος, σοφία (the remarkable phrase “being known of God” is only another expression for that immanence, 1 Cor. viii. 2, *al.*), and of the affections of the κ. which is the special seat of its operation, shedding abroad the love of God, and generating the various fruits of religious experience, peace, joy, hope, the rich harvest of the κάρπος τοῦ πνεύματος. . . . But all this points to the gradual completion of a process; and what is to be said of the σῶμα νεκρόν, in view of the fact that the σῶμα σαρκός remains after baptism as before, that the σ. does not even appear to cease subsisting? It is true that the Apostle frequently gives *exhortations* which point to a continuance of the σ., and prescribe the Christian’s attitude to it. But let us consider what is implied in such exhortation. The state of Rom. vii. 23-25 can no longer exist in the man to whom such exhortation is addressed. It presupposes that radical changes have taken place, that the ν. has become free and strong, that the σ. has had its power broken and received its death-blow. But the nature of the case implies that what faith in abstract-dogmatic form boldly anticipating posits and sees as a *fruit accompli* is but slowly realised (comp. the expressions in Rom. vi. 11 ff. and Rom. viii. 13). . . . Here we have a glimpse of the distinction between the Hellenistico-Pagan and the Pauline-Christian mode of thought, for the former of which the conflict is continually being renewed without prospect of definitive decision, while for the latter the result of the struggle is definitely secured by the conquest of the σ. through Christ—by the characteristic idea of redemption from the σ. which separates Paul from the dualism of the time.

The σ . is in the course of dying off; and Paul exhorts that this process be not interrupted by any revival of its *ἐπιθυμία*. This idea is at the root also of Paul's freedom from any *ascetic* way of regarding the *sensuous* nature.

But the objection may recur, whether it is not merely the $\acute{\alpha}\mu$. that is hit, while the σ . without it continues to subsist? Various expressions seem to favour this view, as at Rom. vi. 2: *ἀπεθάνομεν τῇ ἁμ.*; at verses 7, 10, 11, 12, 13 ff. it is always merely the $\acute{\alpha}\mu$. that the death concerns; the *σῶμα* remains everywhere intact; at 2 Cor. vii. 1 we are warned against defilement of the σ ., and at 2 Cor. iv. 10, 11 it even partakes of the life of Jesus. But all this is mere seeming; there is here also pure solidarity of the $\acute{\alpha}\mu$. with the σ The position of the σ . at all in the *πνευματικός* can only have been conceded by Paul in the sense of an *interim* arrangement, *pending* the approach of the Parousia. . . . Here comes in the distinction of σ . and *σῶμα*, the latter capable of emancipation from the former, though for this life still sharing its matter; having as an organism a part in the *ἀγιότης* (1 Cor. vii. 34), and serving generally as an instrument for the π . Θεοῦ in man (1 Cor. vi. 13-19; Rom. vi. 13, 19, *al.*).

After a review of several passages bearing on this distinction—such as 2 Cor. vii. 1; 2 Cor. iv. 10 ff.; 2 Cor. i. 4 ff.; Rom. viii. 19-21, 26, 27—comes the concluding section as to the resurrection, whereby the *ἀπολύτρωσις τοῦ σώματος* is completed, when the earthy body has been taken away, and the *σῶμα πνευματικόν* is bestowed. Paul, in keeping with his conception of the σ ., knows no resurrection of the flesh. He never uses the verb which might point to an independent rising of the body, *ἀναστῆναι*. The σ . is *φθορά*, and abides in death. Nor does he know any resurrection of the unredeemed. The

identity of the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ as such before and after the resurrection enables us to explain the apparently so confused Pauline usage, in virtue of which he at Rom. viii. 10 calls the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ "νεκρόν," then at verse 11 contemplates the $\xi\omega\pi\omicron\iota\epsilon\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ of the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ θνητόν, and at verse 23 again longs after the ἀπολύτρωσις of the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$. This ἀπολύτρωσις is the $\xi\omega\pi\omicron\iota\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$, and the latter is the taking away of the σάρξ-substance from the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ -form, and the filling of the same with the πνεῦμα-substance. . . . The dualism is cancelled not by conciliation of its parts in virtue of a dialectic bridging over of the gulf, but by the violent destruction of the one principle that succumbs, the σ . ; and in this respect the Apostle separates himself sharply from the Jewish consciousness, for which the σ . is, and remains, quite *unobjectionable*.

The *third* part, entitled "the Position of the anthropology within the doctrine of salvation," is mainly devoted to a discussion of what Dr. Lüdemann calls "the problem in the first eight chapters of the Epistle to the Romans," in which we deem it the less necessary to follow him, partly because it carries us beyond the limits of the subject with which we are here specially concerned, and partly because the views therein set forth have not commended themselves—so far as I know—to any one else than their author (See pp. 48, 49, 67 and 86-89).

B.—DR. WENDT ON THE OLD TESTAMENT USAGE.

The following is a translation, occasionally somewhat abridged, of the portion of Dr. Wendt's work in which he treats of the use of *basar* and *ruach*.

I. THE CONCEPTION OF BASAR.

The word *basar* in its original and most frequent signification denotes the *flesh* as the muscular constituent portion of an earthly animal organism in distinction from skin, bones, blood (*e.g.* Num. xix. 5; Job x. 11; xix. 20; Ezek. xxxvii. 6-8). It is so used of the fleshy portions of the living body as well as of that which is already dead; the latter especially in the many passages where it appears either as means of nourishment in general (alongside of bread or wine: Exod. xvi. 3, 8, 12; Is. xxii. 13, *al.*), or as the chief material for the sacrificial meals (Lev. vii. 15; Hos. viii. 13, *al.*). This sacrificial flesh is as such called holy (Ex. xxix. 33 f.; Hagg. ii. 12), in sharp contrast to which stands flesh from whatever cause unclean and withheld from use (Lev. xi. 8 ff. *al.*); evidently therefore the flesh in this literal sense is of itself *indifferent* as to cleanness or uncleanness. The fleshy parts lend to the body its fulness and beauty (Gen. xli. 2 ff.; Dan. i. 15).

The transition to a *second* and extended use of the word is found in its employment to express *relation of kindred* conceived as based on community of bodily substance, most fully in the phrase "bone of my bone and flesh of my flesh" (Gen. ii. 23, *al.*), more briefly "thy bone and thy flesh" (2 Sam. v. 1, *al.*), also simply in that of "our

flesh" (Gen. xxxvii. 27 ; Is. lviii. 7). In this latter case the flesh alone represents the substance of the body generally ; the fuller formula is *she'er besaro* (Lev. xviii. 6 ; xxv. 49), where *basar* as body is distinguished from *she'er* as flesh in the narrower sense. Sometimes the other chief element of the body—the bones (*'etsem*)— is also used to denote the whole body (Lam. iv. 7 ; Ps. cxxxix. 15)

This use of *flesh* for *body* is not to be spoken of as a real change of *meaning*, but as merely an extension of *use*, resting on the synecdoche of the part put for the whole. The word itself is not to be conceived as carrying the general signification of animate *matter* of which the body consists, so that the signification of simple flesh would be merely a special application of the general sense. For, 1st, no Old Testament passage can be pointed out, where *basar* really means merely animate matter in general ; and, 2nd, it is to be noted that we meet the designation of the body by *basar* mainly at places where the *surface* of the body is dealt with—where the body comes precisely into view not as regards its material substance, but as regards its organised outward form (comp. Lev. vi. 3 ; xv. 13, 16 ; xix. 28 ; xxi. 5 ; xxii. 6 ; Num. viii. 7 ; 1 Kings xxi. 27 ; 2 Kings vi. 30 ; Job iv. 15 ; Is. xvii. 4). This latter circumstance puts us on the more correct track, and leads to the conclusion that the designation of the body as flesh owes its origin not to the consideration of its materiality, but to that of its outward appearance. Because it acquires its *aspect*, shape, and colour mainly from the fleshy parts, it is named from what is most important for appearance ; and, as this aspect of flesh applies only to the *human* body not covered by skin, feathers, or the like, it is perhaps by no mere accident that not a single passage occurs where *basar* denotes the body of an animal, while the

word is used with comparative frequency of that of man.

In this enlarged signification we find the flesh frequently placed in contradistinction to the *nephesh* or the *lebh*, those natural constituents of earthly living beings, which form the seat of the higher vital and mental functions, not coming under the cognisance of the senses and not subject to the laws of outward nature (Ps. lxxiii. 2; Job xiii. 14; Ezek. xxxvi. 26; Ps. xvi. 9 ff. *al.*). . . .

We encounter a *third* application in the oft recurring phrase *kol-basar*, as well as in a small number of other passages (Gen. vi. 3; Is. xxxi. 3; Jer. xvii. 5; Ps. lviii. 5; lxxviii. 39; Job x. 4; Dan. ii. 11; 2 Chron. xxxii. 8). Here we perceive at once that it is no longer used either of the flesh on the body, or of the whole body taking its name from the flesh. When it is affirmed of "all flesh" as subject, that it has corrupted its way upon earth (Gen. vi. 12), or that on the ground of the divine revelations of judgment it comes to know that Jehovah is the Saviour and Redeemer of Israel (Is. xlix. 26; comp. xl. 5; Ezek. xxi. 4, 5), or that it comes up to worship Jehovah (Is. lxvi. 23; comp. Ps. lxv. 2; cxlv. 21), it is evident that it is meant to designate not merely the outward bodily side, but *living beings generally*, inclusive of their inner mental nature. And the *way* in which this designation comes to be thus used seems quite similar to that in the second use of "flesh" for the whole "body"—a synecdoche by which the part is put for the whole, and man is spoken of according to what constitutes his outward aspect. And just as we saw formerly "bone" employed also for the body as a whole, so here we find the other phrase drawn from the inner man, *kol-nephesh*, similarly applied to denote not merely all souls of living beings, but the living beings generally, inclusively of their

bodily nature. Each of these phrases rests on a synecdoche; only the parts chosen to designate the whole are different.

Now when we come to ask what are the *grounds* for the selection of "flesh" in the passages in question as the most fitting *part* for such synecdochic use, the answer is to be obtained by a comparison of the passages adduced, in which we encounter a peculiarity common to them and most significant. Wherever living beings are expressed in terms of this synecdoche, they stand in a clear *contrast to God*. In the majority of the passages the designation is met with, where *God is Himself the speaker*, so that in these that contrast is already expressed, if it is not further emphasised; at all other passages the contradistinction to God is sharply and expressly brought into prominence (comp. Num. xvi. 22; xxvii. 16; Deut. v. 23; Ps. lxxv. 3; cxxxvi. 25; cxlv. 21; Job xii. 10; xxxiv. 15 *al.*). Under such circumstances we can hardly doubt that we have to seek the main motive for this usage in that intentional *contradistinction* to God. Living beings were to be designated not *simply* as such, but *so*, that this contrast to God should find clear expression; and that purpose would be most readily accomplished by describing them in terms of the part in which that contrast was *most directly apparent*.

If we further ask of *what nature* was the contrast thus brought out between God and living beings on earth, we get a sure basis for a decision in the passage, Is. xxxi. 3: "Egypt is man and not God, and their horses are *basar* and not *ruach*." The parallelism shows that the notion of *basar* stands in the same relation to that of man as the notion of *ruach* to that of God. But the *ruach* of God denotes—as may be here assumed by anticipation—throughout the Old Testament not the Spirit as a separate Divine

Person, or as the celestial substance of the Divine Being, but the supernatural *operation of power*, by virtue of which God makes Himself known in the world of nature and of spirit. This is confirmed by all the other passages in which the divine *ruach* is opposed to the "flesh" (Gen. vi. 3; Numb. xvi. 22; xxvii. 16; Job, xii. 10; xxxiv. 14 f.; Joel iii. 1). Here, therefore, when living beings on earth are named flesh overagainst God, so far as He works by His Spirit, we easily see that they are so termed not as regards the distinction of their *substance*, but as regards their *power and mode of working*. That *basar* itself conveys the notion of substance, and not of power, is certainly beyond doubt; but this term is here applied to them by way of synecdoche, to characterise them not merely as possessed of this substance *as such*, but as possessed of the peculiar *power* of this substance. This result is not at all invalidated by the fact that they are so named to bring out their *want* of power, their utter impotence; for, whether the existence of power is to be asserted or denied, in any case the stress rests on the notion of power as determining the choice of the word. And it is easy to explain why it should be so chosen; for it is in the corporeal nature falling under the cognizance of the senses, and especially in the flesh-portions which so readily fall a prey to corruption, that the perishableness and nothingness of man come most clearly to light, whereby he stands in absolute contrast to God. The word thus denotes living beings *with the connotation of the absolute weakness and perishableness of their nature in distinction from the power and living operation of God*—a sense which we shall perhaps best express by the word "creature" ("*Geschöpf*" oder *Kreatur*).

This sense is vouched for by all the passages at which this use of *basar* occurs. The formula *kol-basar* is opposed

to the spirit of God, on which the creature depends for existence, and the withdrawal of which involves its destruction (Job xii. 10 ; xxxiv. 14 f. ; Is. xl. 6 f.) ; for this reason Jehovah is called "God of all flesh" (Numb. xxvii. 16 ; Jer. xxxii. 27) or more fully "God of the spirits of all flesh" (Numb. xvi. 22). Hence the folly of making the creature one's arm (Jer. xvii. 23), while they who trust in God may not fear, because flesh cannot harm them (Ps. lvi. 5 ; 2 Chron. xxxii. 8). We meet with the expression *basar* at passages which treat of the reverence of the creatures confronting God's power and majesty (Ps. lxv. 3 ; cxxxvi. 25 ; cxlv. 21 ; Zech. ii. 17 ; Deut. v. 23). The "all flesh" recurs with especial frequency where the destroying judgments of God are spoken of (Gen. vi-ix. ; Is. xl. 5 f. ; xlix. 26 ; lxvi. 16 ; Jer. xii. 12 ; xxv. 31 ; xlv. 5 ; Ezek. xxi. 4 *al.*), less frequently when the converse—the salvation of the last time—is referred to (Joel iii. 1 ; Zech. ii. 17). At most passages the expression doubtless embraces under it *men and animals* (*e.g.*, Gen. vi. 17 ff. ; Lev. xvii. 14 ; Num. xviii. 15 ; Ps. cxxxvi. 25 ; Is. xl. 6), but elsewhere the connection shows that *only men* are meant (*e.g.* Gen. vi. 12 f. ; Is. lxvi. 23 ; Ps. lvi. 5 [comp. verse 12 "man"] ; lxv. 3 ; Job xii. 10 ; Joel iii. 1)—a diversity springing from the fact that the phrase is used not merely as a collective notion to denote the *whole mass* of earthly creatures, but primarily to denote the *peculiar character* (*Beschaffenheit*) common to them in contrast to God.

The question next arises whether, in addition to the connotation of *natural weakness*, it does not sometimes include an element of *moral blame*, a suggestion of *sinfulness*. This question has often been answered in the affirmative with an appeal to Gen. vi. 5 and to Ps. lxxviii. 39. In the former passage—which belongs to an apparently iso-

lated fragment probably first inserted here by the *redacteur* of the Pentateuch, and not specially connected with the history of the deluge that follows—the point with which we are now concerned is the inserted clause, which contains at any rate the specification of a ground for the divine judgment, rendered in the A. V.: “for that he also is flesh,” which admits of being interpreted differently according to a slight change in the pointing of the first word. The view recently defended by Dillmann, who points it *beshaggām*, deriving it from *shagag*, and makes it mean: “on account of their transgression or aberration he is flesh, that is, still merely flesh,” is liable to the objections, that there is no mention of sin in the context, which speaks rather of an increase of the natural vigour of life, that might, it is suggested, be compensated by a restriction of its duration; that the words “still merely” [*nur noch*] are imported without warrant, and the sense assigned to flesh is drawn from the New Testament rather than from the Old; and that the *enallage numeri* in the suffix of the *beshaggām* is very harsh, if not impossible, while Dillmann’s reference of it to the “sons of God” lessens the linguistic harshness only to increase the difficulty of the contents, for the main matter, “the thereby developed tendency to the sensuous,” would, as Dillmann admits, have to be supplied. The other interpretation, which takes it as = *ba’asher gām*, and renders: “for that he too is flesh,” has the support of all the old translations. The objections to it may be reduced to two, that the *š* = *asher*, is foreign to the *usus loquendi* of the Pentateuch, and that the *gam* is altogether superfluous. The former must be granted; but the passage stands isolated, and the occurrence of the *š* in the book of Judges and even in Deborah’s song (v. 7; comp. vi. 17; vii. 12; viii. 26) attests the possibility of the form even for the older

language. The other again has little relevancy, for the order of the words suggests a reference of the *gam* to *hu* and not to *basar*; and the passage seems to give the appropriate sense, that, notwithstanding any impression to the contrary that might be produced by the emergence of a Titanic race, *man too* belongs to the general category of the creature, and has his life not as his own and incapable of being lost, but as given by God and subject to withdrawal at such term as He appoints.

In Psalm lxxviii. 39, the whole clearness and beauty of the passage would be lost, if we should assume in the phrase: "and he remembered that they are flesh" the transition completed from the conception of weakness into that of sin, as Tholuck does. Immediately before it is said that God "covers" iniquity; and how could it be added that God remembers the Israelites, so far as they are flesh, that is, so far as in their nature lies the seat and origin of sin? and what is to be made in that case of the apposition to *basar*: "breath that passeth away and returneth not"? Obviously the words contain not a reason explaining on God's part the sin of the Israelites from their being flesh, but rather a motive for His covering of their sin, for His forgiveness, based on their weak and transient nature. The same motive appears at Psalm xxxix. 14; ciii. 13 f.; Amos vii. 25.

On the other hand, various passages in the book of Job seem to assert man's inability to justify himself before God, and connect that inability with his being dust (such as iv. 17 ff.; xv. 14 ff.; xxv. 1 ff.) . . . To understand the argument in these cases, we must look at the question not from our Western notions of right, but from the Oriental point of view, according to which the question of right was primarily a question of *might*. "As in the gate, that is, in the judicial assembly, that man is not

put to shame in the process with his enemies, who appears at the spot with the due number of stalwart sons in his train (Psalm cxxvii. 5), so conversely, when contending with God, man is from the outset and absolutely in the wrong, because, confronted with God, he is absolute *weakness*." . . . The references to the frailty and affinity to dust of man, so far from being intended to explain human *sinfulness*, are merely adduced to make good man's utter *destitution of right* (*Rechtlosigkeit*) *in presence of God, notwithstanding even of possibly existent sinlessness*. Nor can the references to Levitical uncleanness occasioned by contact with certain forms of disease, or with a dead body, be regarded as vouchers for natural frailty and mortality being viewed at the same time as moral defect. For this Levitical impurity has nothing to do with sinfulness in the proper ethical sense. . . . Nor is there any trace of an allusion to this sort of impurity in the conception of *basar*, as it denotes in the Old Testament creaturely beings.

II. THE CONCEPTION OF RUACH.

The remarkably varied applications of this conception in the Old Testament find the explanation which binds them into unity in the original signification of "wind." Its chief marks to be here taken account of are those of movement and of invisibility.

First, the wind presents itself as a moved and moving nature-force, seizing moveable objects, sweeping them before it, and spreading destruction. With the Orientals it was regarded primarily as a *destructive* agency; very seldom is it wished for, as when it brings rain (2 Kings iii. 17; Prov. xxv. 14); otherwise it appears everywhere dreaded, partly for its destructive power intensi-

fied in southern climates (Job i. 19 ; Psalm xlviii. 8 ; cvii. 25 ff.) ; partly for its withering effects (Isaiah xl. 7 ; Ezek. xvii. 10 ; Hosea xiii. 15, *al.*). It is very often symbol of annihilation (Isaiah xvii. 13 ; Jeremiah xiii. 24 ; Psalm i. 4, *al.*).

As regards its other significant peculiarity of *invisibility*, it may be judged of from two points of view—either as *unsearchable* in its origin, or as *immaterial* in its nature. Closely as these come into contact, they give occasion to two very divergent chains of thought. So far as the wind in its enigmatical origin lies beyond the sphere of experience (Eccl. xi. 5), it is referred directly to God ; it is God who creates the wind (Amos iv. 13), brings it out of his treasure-chambers (Jer. x. 13 ; Psalm cxxxv. 7) ; determines the weight for it (Job xxviii. 25) ; sends, turns, or directs it (Gen. viii. 1 ; Ex. x. 13, 19 ; xiv. 21 ; xv. 10 ; Num. xi. 31, *al.*). The winds are his messengers, executing His word (Psalm civ. 4 ; cxlviii. 8) ; He is himself described as travelling on the wings of the wind (Psalm xviii. 11) ; and it plays a remarkable part in the passing of God before Elijah (1 Kings xix. 11), in the night-vision of Eliphaz (Job iv. 15, “ a wind,” not “ a spirit ”), and in the vision of Ezekiel (i. 4).

On the other hand the Hebrew has a vivid consciousness of the fact that the wind lacks sensuous visiblens and the other marks by which the *reality* of a thing is wont to be tested. “ To grasp the wind ” is a proverbial expression for an impossibility (Prov. xxvii. 16 ; xxx. 4), and so *ruach* becomes emblem and expression for what is empty, null, unreal, so that the sceptic illustrates his sermon of the vanity of all human existence and action by comparison with the “ pursuit of wind ” (Eccl. i. 14, 17 ; ii. 11, 17, 26, *al.*). Under this point of view, it may mean the very opposite of what it means

when regarded as of divine origin ; and *ruach*, in this sense of windy nothingness, may form a contrast to almost all the other significations of the word. [Of this several interesting illustrations are given.]

With the sense of wind is immediately associated that of *breath*, as bearing essentially in its invisible motion the form under which the wind manifests itself. As the seat of the breath are named the nostrils (Job xxvii. 3 ; Lam. iv. 20, *al.*), or the mouth (Ps. cxxxv. 17, *al.*), or the lips (Is. xi. 4), or the interior of man generally (Zech. xii. 1 ; Heb. ii. 19, *al.*). And as the breath presents itself as a wind in man, the wind may conversely be apprehended as the breath of God, which issues (anthropomorphically) from his nostrils (Ex. xv. 8 ; 2 Sam. xxii. 16, *al.*). A further step makes the breath of man appear directly as the breath of God, so that in Ps. civ. 29, 30, *rucham* "their (men's) breath," and *rucheka* "thy (God's) breath" may be interchanged. The *ruach* belongs to man, so far as it stirs and works in him ; to God, in so far as he has sent or breathed it forth. . . .

From these combinations between the wind, the breath of God and the human breath arise manifold, and in their turn opposite, relations for the *ruach*. As the wind is chiefly a destroying and dreaded nature-force, so the breath, resembling in its snorting movement that of stormy wind, gets the sense of *anger* (Judg. viii. 3 ; Ezek. iii. 14 ; Job xv. 13 ; Prov. xvi. 32). God's *ruach* in this sense of blast of anger is always destructive of life (Job iv. 9 ; Is. iv. 4 ; Zech. vi. 8, *al.*). Where the point of view of impetuous movement falls into abeyance, the process of breathing is felt to be the proper mark of all that lives, and so the *ruach* becomes transformed into the opposite sense of the creating and preserving *life-breath*, which is altogether of divine origin. This life-breath of

God it was, which moved over chaos (Gen. i. 2) and created the host of heaven (Ps. xxxiii. 6). . . . We have seen in discussing *basar* how it is the communication of the divine life-spirit to the creature, that forms the ground on the one hand of all possibility and power of creaturely existence, and on the other of its entire dependence on God; it remains that we now notice the further passages where there is not the word *basar* as opposed to *ruach*. God forms or gives the life-spirit to man and to all that walk on earth (Zech. xii. 1; Is. xlii. 5); by this life-breath the creatures are made, and by it what is already dead may be recalled to existence (Job xxxiii. 4; Ps. civ. 30; Ezek. xxxvii.), while on the withdrawal of the breath by God the creature falls unto death and earth (Ps. civ. 29; cxlvi. 4). The basis of the conception here clearly is, that the life-breath of the creature, as it was in its origin a communication of God's own breath, returns at death to the fulness of the divine breath—which is described as a being-gathered-in-again by God (Job xxxiv. 14; Ps. civ. 29). The same thought occurs in the celebrated passage Eccl. xii. 7: "The dust returns to the earth in keeping with its nature, and the life-breath returns to God, who has given it." . . .

To the divine *ruach* in man are referred all the several states under which his life-power subsists and shows itself. When impressions of terror or surprise overwhelm man, it is said, the life-breath no longer subsists (Josh. ii. 11 [A. V. "courage"]; v. 1; 1 Kings x. 5); under opposite refreshing or reinvigorating influences, it is said, that the life-breath revives or comes back (Hab. i. 11; Gen. xlv. 27; Judg. xv. 19; 1 Sam. xxx. 12); the failing, extinguishing, or emptying of the breath is the proper designation for the ceasing of the vital power (Is. lvii. 16; Ps. lxxvii. 4; cxliii. 4; Ezek. xxi. 12; Is.

xix. 3, *al.*). The same sense of the word appears in the phrase *hé'ir-eth-ruach*—"to stir the life-spirit," *i.e.* to instigate any one (Hagg. i. 14; 1 Chron. v. 26; 2 Chron. xxi. 16; xxxvi. 32; Ezra i. 1, 5).

In what relation does this *ruach* stand to the *nepesh*, the soul? Are the two notions equivalent, or are they so different as to denote two co-ordinate parts of the nature of living beings? There is unmistakeably great likeness between them. The soul is treated also as seat and centre of the vital powers; all things that promote or hinder the life are placed in relation to it (Ps. vi. 4; xvii. 13; xxii. 21, 30; xxvi. 9; xxxiii. 19, *al.*), and the like predicates are used of it as of the *ruach*, when the renewal or dying out of the life is spoken of (comp. Ps. cvii. 5; Jon. ii. 8 with Ps. lxxvii. 4 [*hitk'atleph*]; 1 Kings xvii. 22 with 1 Samuel xxx. 12 [*shubh*]; Gen. xxxv. 18 with Ps. cxlvi. 4 [*yatza*]). But there are other marks pointing to a not inconsiderable difference.

First it is to be noted that the *nepesh* is primarily the seat of individuality, personality, or self-consciousness. Hence it is often, especially in poetic diction, merely a fuller designation for the Ego. While other things are, or might be, more or less common to man, each man's soul belongs to him as his own most special property, which cannot be exchanged or, in the event of loss, reacquired. Hence it is the dearest possession that man has, and the poets may well interchange it with "my darling" (Ps. xxii. 21; xxxv. 17), or "my glory" (Ps. xvi. 9; xxx. 13 (12); lvii. 9 (8); cviii. 2 (1)). For the same reason, all natural and mental impulses, in which the individual self asserts itself, are apprehended as immediate functions of the soul. To it is ascribed *e.g.* the activity of longing [*ivrah*] (Deut. xii. 15, 20; 2 Sam. iii. 21; 1 Kings xi. 37; Is. xxvi. 8 *f. al.*); "to lift up the

soul" is equivalent to "to desire" (Jer. xxii. 27; Hos. iv. 8; Ps. xxiv. 4; xxv. 1); hence in the sense of censure *nephesh* probably signifies also selfish greed (Ps. xxvii. 12; xxxv. 25; xli. 3). This signification of individuality so characteristic of the *nephesh* is entirely wanting to the *ruach*. The life-spirit is in all creatures of like character and effect; it forms a preponderantly *common* mark of living beings, while the *nephesh* is individual.

But this first difference is but the consequence of another and deeper one. The *ruach* stands in quite a different relation to God than the *nephesh*. It is viewed as an immediate outbreathing of God; it is but a part of the general divine *ruach*, which creates and preserves life everywhere, and does not lose its character as such, even when at work in an individual earthly creature. Quite different is it with the *nephesh* in presence of God. No doubt at several places there is mention of a *nephesh* of God, where in manifest anthropomorphism certain emotions are ascribed to God (Ps. xi. 5; Prov. vi. 10; Is. xlii. 1; Jer. vi. 8, *al.*); but the soul of the creatures is never regarded, like the *ruach*, as an efflux or portion of that divine *nephesh*. The soul depends on God, because it is given by God (Gen. ii. 7; Jer. xxxviii. 16); but the life-spirit depends on God, because it is itself divine.

A third difference turns on the dissimilarity of their fate after death. The spirit of the finite creatures returns to God. But we nowhere read in the Old Testament of the souls of the dead coming to God. The *nephesh* is by death absolutely severed from God. When the conception of a continued existence of the departed in Sheol, remote altogether from the divine presence, is expressed, it is the *nephesh* that is the subject of that shadowy sad existence (Ps. xvi. 10; xxx. 4; xlix. 15; lxxxvi. 13); nay, even the corpse, which stands in sharpest contrast to God

and the living spirit, may be designated as *nephesh*, probably because it bears, and so long as it bears, the lineaments of the individual personality (Lev. xxi. 11 ; xxii. 4 ; Num. v. 2 ; vi. 6 ; Hagg. ii. 13).

How are we on the basis of these distinctions to conceive the mutual relation of *ruach* and *nephesh* ? First, it is plain that they do not stand side by side simply co-ordinate, so that we can derive from them the usual trichotomous scheme. For, as the differences exhibited between them essentially concern their origin and issue, which do not admit of being established by experience, they are to be taken as diversities, not of *contents* and of *mode of operation*, so much as of *value*. Further, we must distinctly reject the view, which would regard the spirit as the collective expression (*Inbegriff*) of the higher powers that form the ground of the divine image in man, and thereby at the same time of his distinction from the animals consisting only of body and soul. The Old Testament does not enter upon a demarcation of human and animal psychology ; and least of all is the *ruach* common to all creatures fitted to furnish the principle for such a demarcation.

Much more deserving of attention is the view (of Oehler) that, according to the Old Testament, the whole man only consists dichotomously of *basar* and *nephesh*, while the *divine ruach* is the power, which by its very union with matter produces animate beings, and then as divine power continues to subsist in those two anthropological constituents as its organs and objects of its operation. Nevertheless, even this interpretation seems to me not admissible. If any Old Testament author applied the two conceptions side by side in such a way as to show clearly that he referred them to an unity of psychological system, or if we should be led to suppose that such an

unity of system must have lain ready to the hand of all the authors who use the two terms, then that combination might perhaps commend itself. But in reality there is no ground for such assumptions. We may shape the answer to our question more correctly to this effect : the two conceptions denote the same quantity (*Grösse*), but with a different estimate of value, *because from different points of view*. The nature of living beings may be judged in a twofold way, either by comparison with God, or by comparison with inanimate nature ; in the former there prevails the *religious* point of view, which distinguishes what in the creatures is earthly and what divine ; in the latter there prevails the physical (or anthropological) point of view, which distinguishes what in them is of material bodily nature and what is of an immaterial mental nature. The mental life-powers are called *ruach*, so far as they connect the creatures with God and place them in dependence upon Him ; they are called *nephesh*, so far as they separate the creatures as animate individuals from one another and from the lifeless impersonal world of sense. A clear confirmation of this distinction is yielded by the words of Job xii. 10 : “in whose hand is the soul of every living thing and the spirit of all flesh of man.” The parallelism of the two portions of the verse shows that the notions *nephesh* and *ruach* are related to one another just as the phrases “every living thing” (*kol-chay*) and “all flesh” (*kol-basar*). Now, as the two latter expressions denote as regards contents quite the same thing, but under the different points of view, that in the one case the living beings are placed in contrast to inanimate nature, and in the other the creatures in contrast to God, it is clear that we must assume for our notions of *nephesh* and *ruach* a diversity not of the contents, but of the point of view.

Let us turn now to the comparison of *ruach* with *lebh*,

which at once suggests itself when we look at a new, often used signification of our term. The passages are quite isolated, at which *ruach* without addition appears to denote the thinking activity of the mind, e.g., Ezek. xi. 5 (xx. 32), in the combination *mā'aloṭh ruḥeykhem*, "that which cometh up in your mind," while elsewhere is regularly found the phrase, *'alah 'al lebḥ* (Jer. iii. 16; vii. 31; xix. 5, *al.*) or Psalm lxxvii. 7, where a diligent search is affirmed of the spirit. But with great frequency we find the word *ruach* combined with some designation of quality, where, generally speaking, a definite mental state is to be characterised. This qualitative notion is attached to the *ruach* either attributively (e.g., *ruach nēdhibhah*, Psalm li. 14), or constructively (e.g., *morath ruach*, Gen. xxvi. 35), or lastly predicatively (e.g., *tiktṣar ruach*, Job xxi. 4). The origin of this new signification may easily be discerned. When the *ruach* is spoken of as "shortened," what was originally thought of was the short rapid drawing of the breath, and only thence was it transferred to the impatient disposition therein expressing itself; in the opposite conception *'ereḥ appayim* (Prov. xiv. 29; xvi. 32) the original sense is more clearly apparent. Similar is the case with the *ruach kehah* (Isaiah lxi. 3), where the breath dying out is primarily the sensuous expression of the depressed mental state. In the use of other such expressions as *shebher ruach* (Isaiah lxv. 14), *shēphal-ruach* (Prov. xvi. 19; Is. lvii. 15) that original signification has already quite disappeared.

For most of these designations there may be shown parallel phrases formed with *lebḥ*, e.g., "hard of spirit" (1 Sam. i. 15) and "hard of heart" (Ezek. iii. 7), "erring in spirit" (Is. xxix. 24) and "erring in heart" (Ps. xc. 10); "grieved in spirit" (Is. liv. 6) and

“grieved in heart” (Prov. xv. 13); “breaking of spirit” (Is. lxxv. 14) and “broken in heart” (Ps. xxxiv. 19); “a firm spirit” (Ps. li. 12) and “a firm heart” (Ps. lvii. 8; cviii. 2). *Ruach* and *lebh* are also found side by side, each with such a designation of quality: as “broken in heart and contrite in spirit” (Psalm xxxiv. 19); “a clean heart and a firm spirit” (Psalm li. 12; and so at Ex. xxxv. 21; Deut. ii. 30; Is. lvii. 15; Ezek. xi. 19; Prov. xvii. 22); lastly, at the two passages, Ezek. xviii. 31 and li. 19, the two words stand side by side, joined with the same attributes—a clear proof that *ruach* and *lebh* have in all these cases a signification nearly akin but yet not synonymous. To determine the distinction, let us first examine shortly the signification of *lebh*.

The *lebh* is in general seat of all mental conscious activities of living beings, especially of the thoughts, plans, and resolutions (Gen. vi. 5; Ps. xxxiii. 11; Prov. vi. 18, *al.*); so the *lebh* stands specially in contrast to the words of the mouth or the deed of the hands, in which the inward plans and thoughts express themselves (the former, *e.g.* at Isaiah xxix. 13; Ps. xix. 15; xl. 11; xli. 7; lv. 22; the latter at Ps. xxiv. 4; xxxiii. 15). But desires and wishes (Ps. xx. 5; xxi. 3; xxxvi. 4), and especially feelings of all sorts—of joy (Ps. iv. 8; xiii. 6; xvi. 9, *al.*); of confidence (Ps. xxviii. 7); or of fear and apprehension (Ps. xiii. 3; xxv. 17)—have their root in the *lebh*. To this very comprehensive sense of the Hebrew word, the German “Sinn” [mind] would probably best correspond, as we in the term “Herz” think mostly of the seat of the feelings, and besides are inclined to assume a favourable connotation (comp. “hearty, heartless”) which is entirely wanting in the new conception. From

the *lebh* proceed good thoughts and plans just as the bad (e.g., Jer. iii. 17 ; Gen. vi. 5), "to walk or speak according to his heart" is used to describe the opposite of a conduct willed by God (Num. xvi. 28 ; Is. lvii. 17 ; Jer. xxiii. 16). It is the *lebh* that according to its character gives to man the direction in which his thoughts, resolves, and actions move (Psalm xxxvii. 31 ; xlv. 19 ; Jer. iii. 17 ; vii. 24 ; xvii. 5) ; and this especially when it is combined with definite adjectives, intimating that the mind of man, *i.e.*, the contents of his activity of thought and will, is of this or that nature, follows this or that direction. So e.g., *yěshar-lebh*, he who with "upright mind" grasps the right thoughts, purposes, &c., that correspond to God's will ; *nishbar-lebh*, he who, breaking his "wilfulness," subordinates himself to the designs of God ; *'anav-lebh*, he who renouncing high and selfish thoughts readily suits his mind to the relations given by God.

Ruach, in an analogous use, has a somewhat different significance : it denotes not the mind, which determines the different kinds of mental exertion and indirectly of external action *in point of contents* ; but it is the *energy* (*Gemüthskraft*) which, partly as *disposition*, partly as *character*, stamps on all individual expressions of the life of feeling, as of the activity of thought and will, their definite *form*. The two sides, the natural disposition and the moral character, are for the Hebrew consciousness not yet separated ; it is only our later reflection that separates them. The Hebrew conception is, I believe, most completely covered by our [German] word "Muth" in the older signification, which still cleaves to it, when used as simple, only in particular phrases (e.g., "*mir ist so oder so zu Muthe, getrosten, traurigen Muthes sein*"), but in substantive and adjective compounds answers quite

closely to those compound Hebrew expressions, likewise without distinction of natural disposition and ethical character (e.g., *ruach kashah* = Schwermuth; *ruach nē-dhibhah* = Freimuth; *gobhah-ruach* = hochmüthig; *shēphal ruach* = demüthig). The result, moreover, is that strictly speaking there prevails no substantial difference between the designations formed with *ruach* and those with *lebh*, just because the *contents* of the mental activity given in the "mind" is conditioned throughout by the peculiar *form* of the ruling natural or moral tone. As between *ruach* and *nephesh*, so between *ruach* and *lebh* there subsists a distinction not so much of the object, as of the point of view, of the designation.

A new and last signification of *ruach* presents in some degree a blending of the most essential marks resulting from the two already considered. In the foreground comes here first the *mark of divine origin*, which had been no longer apparent in the last discussed use of *ruach*. Formerly we perceived it both in the signification of "wind" and in that of "life-spirit"; in both of which cases there were denoted by *ruach* supernatural operations of God, but yet such as we might regard as comparatively usual and regular. But now it becomes a designation for all the *unusual* and *extraordinary* phenomena, in which an influence of God operating on man shows itself. It is usual, but not strictly quite warrantable, to describe this *ruach* simply as the prophetic. The prophetic *ruach*, which expresses itself in prophetic speech or deed, is in reality only a single, though perhaps the most important, species of a far more comprehensive class of phenomena. In all spheres of human working, physical or mental, achievements, which in prominence of gifts and in significance transcend the measure of ordinary human ability, are referred to the communication of such a divine *ruach*.

So the extraordinary specimens of strength of a Samson are manifestations of the *ruach* which seizes him (Judg. xiii. 26 ; xiv. 6, 19 ; xv. 14) ; so with the successful gifts of the ruler, especially in war (Judg. iii. 10 ; vi. 34 ; 1 Sam. xvi. 13 ; Is. xi. 2) ; so even a single wonderful act, like the dry passage of Elisha through the Jordan, may show the presence of the *ruach* (2 Kings ii. 14 f.). Mentally, all distinguished theoretical or practical ability is proof of a *ruach chokhmah ubhinah* communicated by God ; so with artists and poets (Ex. xxviii. 3 ; xxxi. 3 ; xxxv. 31 ; 2 Sam. xxiii. 2), or in men of special powers of judgment and understanding (Gen. xli. 38 f. ; Deut. xxxiv. 9 ; Is. xi. 2 ; Prov. i. 23 ; Job xx. 3, *al.*). But especially are gifts in the religious sphere, which can least of all be understood from merely natural presuppositions, a manifestation of such a God-sent *ruach*, whose organ is the *nabhi* and whose effect is the *nibba* or *hithnabbē* (Num. xi. 25 ff. ; 1 Sam. x. 6, 10 ; Is. lxi. 1 ; Ezek. xi. 5 ; Joel iii. 1 f. ; Mic. iii. 8 ; 1 Chron. xii. 18 ; 2 Chron. xv. 1, *al.*). Accordingly the revelation of God in the *Torah*, as well as all further witness of God among the people on the basis of the *Torah*, has taken place in the divine *ruach* through the medium (*bēyadh*) of the prophets (Zech. vii. 12 ; Neh. ix. 20, 30).

The predicates used of this extraordinary divine *ruach*, which we may briefly hereafter designate as the *transcendental*, are : *labhash*, "to put on" (Judg. vi. 34 ; 1 Chron. xii. 18, *al.*), *tsalach'al*, "to fall upon" (Judg. xiv. 6, 19 ; xv. 14 ; 1 Sam. x. 6, 10, *al.*), *nuach*, not "to rest," but "to settle itself" (Num. xi. 25 f. : 2 Kings ii. 15 ; Is. xi. 2), *millē* (Ex. xxxi. 3 ; xxxv. 31 ; Mic. iii. 8), *hayah'al* (Num. xxiv. 2 ; Judg. iii. 10 ; 1 Sam. xix. 9, 20 ff., *al.*). When God is named as communicating sub-

ject, there is used *nathan* (Is. xlii. 1 ; Ezek. xxxvi. 27 ; xxxvii. 14) or *sim* (Num. xi. 17 ; Is. lxiii. 11) or *shaphakh* (Joel iii. 1 f. ; Zech. xii. 10 ; Ezek. xxxix. 29). Two main marks of our *ruach* may be recognised from these predicates.

[The substance of what follows is sufficiently indicated in the text, pp. 122-126.]

C.—CONSPECTUS OF THE FACTS OF PAULINE USAGE.

The facts, readily accessible for reference through the excellent Concordance of Bruder or the smaller volume of Schmoller, are brought together and classified in the several lexicons of New Testament Greek, especially in those of Grimm and Cremer. But it may be convenient for the reader to have them presented here at one view with a reference to the chief passages falling under each group or illustrating each variety of meaning. My object here is simply to tabulate, not to discuss, them. For a fuller statement I may specially refer to the new (third) edition of Dr. Cremer's *Biblisch-Theologisches Wörterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Gräcität*, which has just been completed, and has come into my hands as these Lectures were being passed through the press. The article on $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\acute{\xi}$ in particular, to which I should have been glad to have had earlier access, has been so greatly enlarged—in no small degree under the influence of Dr. Wendt's investigations—that from the four pages devoted to

it in the second edition it has grown to eleven in the third.

The following are the chief uses recognised by lexicographers in the Epistles of St. Paul as to

1. Σάρξ.

A. Flesh proper, *caro*, substance covering the bones, 1 Cor. xv. 29 (the only Pauline passage where *σ.* is used of the other creatures); associated with *ὄστρα* at Eph. v. 30; but the words there are of doubtful genuineness. *Κρέας* used of dead flesh: Rom. xiv. 21; 1 Cor. viii. 13.

B. The body itself, designated (by synecdoche of *part* for the whole) from the flesh as its main substance and as *characterising* it: 1 Cor. vi. 16; vii. 28; 2 Cor. iv. 11; vii. 5; x. 3; xii. 7; Gal. ii. 20; iv. 13; iv. 14; Eph. v. 29; Phil. i. 22; i. 24; Col. ii. 1; as also Rom. ii. 28; Eph. ii. 11; Gal. vi. 13; Col. ii. 13; Phil. iii. 3, 4. But, as in several, if not most, of these passages it may be doubtful whether the Apostle's choice of the term does not rest on the *value* associated with it under his more general point of view, Cremer rightly urges that it ought to be translated "flesh," and not to be rendered as "body."

C. The *medium*, in and through which the natural *relationship* of men manifests itself as regards descent, family and national affinity—the obvious *bond* of community between them [based on Gen. ii. 23, 24, quoted at 1 Cor. vi. 16 and Eph. v. 31: *εἰς σάρκα μίαν*]; Gal. iv. 23, 29; 1 Cor. x. 18; Rom. i. 3; ix. 3, 8; xi. 14; Eph. ii. 11; Philem. 16.

D. Human nature designated from the common visible form in which it appears: Col. i. 22; 1 Tim. iii. 16. Akin to this is the use of *σ.* in the phrase *πᾶσα*

σάρξ, reproducing the Hebrew *kol-basar*: 1 Cor. i. 29; Gal. ii. 16; Rom. iii. 20. The same idea is more fully expressed by the association of the blood as vehicle of life with the σάρξ in the phrase (Matt. xvi. 17) σάρξ καὶ αἷμα; 1 Cor. xv. 50; Gal. i. 16; Eph. vi. 12.

E. The natural state, or natural side of man, as contrasted with his Christian state or pneumatic side—an ethico-religious conception in which σ. appears interchangeable with ἄνθρωπος or with παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, in specific contrast to πνεῦμα, and in close association with sin: 1 Cor. iii. 3, 4; Rom. vi. 6, 19; viii. 4-13; 2 Cor. x. 3; i. 17; Gal. iii. 3; v. 13; v. 16-26; vi. 8; Rom. vii. 17, 18, 25; viii. 3; Col. ii. 18, 23, *al.*

The Apostle uses two adjectives derived from σάρξ—σαρκικός and σάρκινος, although in consequence of their similarity in form and affinity of meaning there is some variety of reading in the MSS. and some doubt as to the reading to be preferred.

Σάρκινος—composed of flesh, *fleshy*, is undoubted at 2 Cor. iii. 3, where it is to be taken in the strict literal sense; and it probably deserves the preference at Rom. vii. 14 and 1 Cor. iii. 1.

Σαρκικός—belonging to the flesh, *fleshly*, is employed (a) in reference to the σ. put for the body in Rom. xv. 27 and 1 Cor. ix. 11, and (b) in reference to the σ. as human nature *per se* in contrast to God, at 2 Cor. x. 4.

2. Σῶμα.

Σῶμα is the general term for “body,” as an organism composed of parts or μέλη, and serving as organ for the ψυχή or πνεῦμα with which it is associated. It is used (a) in the proper sense, at the *locus classicus*, 1 Cor. xii. 12-26, where the word occurs sixteen times; 1 Cor.

xv. 35 ff.; Rom. vi. 12; viii. 13; xii. 4; 1 Cor. v. 3; vi. 18; vii. 34; 2 Cor. v. 6, 8, 10; ix. 27; x. 10; Phil. iii. 21; Col. i. 22; ii. 11, *al.*; (*b*) in a figurative sense, of the Church as the body of Christ: 1 Cor. xii. 27; Rom. xii. 5; Eph. i. 23; Col. i. 18 *et al.* (especially frequent in the Epistles to the Ephesians and Colossians).

3. Πνεῦμα.

A. The breath, *anhelitus narium*: 2 Thess. ii. 8. [Hence naturally transferred, in classical Greek and in other Biblical books, to denote the vital principle—*anima qua vivitur*; but this *physiological* sense is not found in St. Paul.]

B. In the *psychological* sense of the spirit or mind of man, the inward self-conscious principle which feels, thinks, and wills: 1 Cor. ii. 11; v. 3; vii. 34; Col. ii. 5; accompanied by a personal pronoun in the genitive: Rom. i. 9; viii. 16; 1 Cor. v. 4; xvi. 18; 2 Cor. ii. 13; vii. 13; Gal. vi. 18; Phil. iv. 23; 1 Thess. v. 23; Philem. 25; 2 Tim. iv. 22.

C. Of the spiritual nature of Christ: 1 Cor. xv. 45; 1 Tim. iii. 16 [Rom. i. 4 ?].

D. (Most frequently in the special sense of) A divine power or influence belonging to God, and communicated in Christ to men, in virtue of which they become *πνευματικοί*: 1 Thess. iv. 8; Gal. iv. 6; Rom. viii. 9. It is designated as:—

(a) *πνεῦμα Θεοῦ*: 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11, 12, 14; iii. 16; vi. 11; vii. 40; xii. 3; 2 Cor. iii. 3; Rom. viii. 9, 11 (*bis*), 14; Eph. iii. 16.

(b) *πνεῦμα Χριστοῦ*: 1 Cor. iii. 17, 18; Gal. iv. 6; Rom. viii. 9; Phil. i. 19.

(c) *πνεῦμα ἁγίου*: 1 Thess. i. 5, 6; iv. 8; 1 Cor. vi. 19;

xii. 3 ; 2 Cor. vi. 6 ; xiii. 13 ; Rom. v. 5 ; ix. 1 ; xiv. 17 ; xv. 13, 16, 19 ; Eph. i. 13 ; iv. 30 ; 2 Tim. i. 14 ; Tit. iii. 5.

(d) πνεῦμα with, or without, the article, but with its definite reference to the πν. Θεοῦ or πν. ἅγιον clearly indicated by the context: 1 Thess. ii. 13 ; 1 Cor. ii. 4, 10, 13 ; xii. 4, 7, 8, 9 (*bis*), 11 ; xii. 13 ; 2 Cor. i. 22 ; iii. 8 ; v. 5 ; Gal. iii. 2, 5, 14 ; v. 16, 18 ; Rom. viii. 16, 23, 26, 27 ; xv. 30 ; Eph. iv. 3 ; vi. 17 ; Phil. ii. 1 ; 1 Tim. iv. 1.

E. A power or influence, the character, manifestations or results of which are more precisely defined by qualifying genitives : 1 Cor. iv. 21 and Gal. vi. 1 π. πραότητος ; 2 Cor. iv. 13 π. πίστεως ; Rom. viii. 2 π. ζωῆς ; 15 π. υιοθεσίας ; Eph. i. 17 π. σοφίας καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως ; 2 Tim. i. 7 π. δυνάμεως καὶ ἀγάπης καὶ σωφροτισμοῦ ; or, in the absence of any such adjunct, are to be gathered from express or implied contrast : *e.g.* Gal. v. 5, 25 ; Eph. v. 18. In several cases π. is contrasted with γράμμα : Rom. ii. 29 ; vii. 6 ; 2 Cor. iii. 6 ; and in numerous others with σάρξ ; especially at Gal. v. 16-24 and Rom. viii. 1-13.

F. The plural πνεύματα, used of the χαρίσματα or spiritual gifts : 1 Cor. xiv. 12, or of the persons who are or profess to be under spiritual influence : 1 Cor. xii. 10.

G. Powers or influences alien from, or adverse to the divine π. are designated by the same term with some qualifying adjunct ; 2 Cor. xi. 4 π. ἕτερον ; 1 Cor. ii. 12 π. κόσμου ; Rom. viii. 15 π. δουλείας ; xi. 8 π. κατανύξεως ; Eph. ii. 2 ; 2 Tim. i. 7.

Πνευματικός, belonging to, or characterised by, πνεῦμα, *i.e.* the divine π., is applied (a) to things : 1 Cor. ii. 13 ; ix. 11 ; x. 3, 4 ; xii. 1 ; xiv. 1 ; xv. 44, 46 ; Rom. i. 11 ; vii. 14 ; xv. 27 ; Eph. i. 3 ; v. 19 ; Col. i. 9 ; iii. 16 ; (b) to persons : Gal. vi. 1 ; 1 Cor. ii. 13 ; iii. 1 ; xiv. 37. Πνευματικῶς occurs at 1 Cor. ii. 14. [The expression τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας, Eph. vi. 12, seems related to the

use of *πνεῦμα* elsewhere in Scripture, but not with St. Paul, to denote spiritual existences or powers higher than man, but inferior to God—whether angels or demons.]

4. Ψυχή.

A. The individual life, the seat of the personal Ego; 1 Thess. ii. 8; 2 Cor. i. 23; xii. 15; Rom. xi. 2; xvi. 4; Phil. ii. 30.

B. The subject of the life, the person in whom it dwells, named *a parte potiori*: 1 Cor. xv. 45; Rom. ii. 9; xiii. 1.

C. The mind as the sentient principle, the seat of sensation and desire, the soul: Phil. i. 27; Eph. vi. 6; Col. iii. 23. Associated with *πνεῦμα* and *σῶμα* at 1 Thess. v. 23.

The adjective *ψυχικός* (in contrast to *πνευματικός*): 1 Cor. ii. 14; xv. 44.

5. Καρδία

Is throughout the *inner central seat and organ* of the personal life in man, regarded in and by himself, and so almost constantly accompanied by the genitive of the possessive pronouns *μου, σου, αὐτοῦ, ἡμῶν, ὑμῶν, αὐτῶν*. It represents the Old Testament *lebh* and is more comprehensive in meaning than our "heart": 1 Cor. ii. 9; iv. 5; xiv. 25; Rom. i. 24; ii. 29; viii. 27; 1 Thess. ii. 4; contrasted with *στόμα*: Rom. x. 10; 2 Cor. vi. 11; with *πρόσωπον*: 1 Thess. ii. 17; 2 Cor. v. 11; appearing as the seat of intelligence: 2 Cor. iii. 15; iv. 6; Rom. i. 21; Eph. i. 18; iv. 18; as the receptacle of impressions: Rom. ii. 15; 2 Cor. iii. 2; as the seat of moral choice and decision: 1 Cor. vii. 37; 2 Cor. ix. 7; Rom. ii. 5; as the

seat of feeling and emotion: 2 Cor. ii. 4 ; vii. 3 ; Rom. ix. 2 ; Phil. i. 7 ; as the source of actions which take thence their character : Rom. vi. 17 ; Eph. vi. 5 ; Col. iii. 22 ; 1 Tim. i. 5 ; 2 Tim. ii. 22 ; as recipient of the divine πνεῦμα : Gal. iv. 6 ; 2 Cor. i. 22 ; Rom. v. 5 ; Eph. iii. 16 ; as the object of the various operations of the divine influence : 1 Thess. iii. 13 ; 2 Thess. ii. 17 ; iii. 5 ; Eph. vi. 22 ; Col. ii. 22 ; Phil. iv. 7 ; as the seat of faith : Rom. x. 9 ; and as the inward organ of spiritual praise : Eph. v. 19 ; Col. iii. 16. Καρδία = ἔσω ἄνθρωπος : Eph. iii. 16.

6. Νοῦς.

A. The mind as consciously exercising its reflective faculty and pronouncing moral judgment : 1 Cor. xiv. 14, 15, 19 ; Rom. i. 28 ; vii. 23, 25 ; xii. 2 ; xiv. 5 ; 1 Cor. v. 10 ; Eph. iv. 17 ; Phil. iv. 7 ; 2 Thess. ii. 2 ; 1 Tim. vi. 5 ; 2 Tim. iii. 8 ; Tit. i. 15.

B. As applied to God or Christ, it denotes, after human analogy, the divine counsels or purposes that are the result of the divine thought : Rom. xi. 34 ; 1 Cor. ii. 16 (*bis*).

At Eph. iv. 23 occurs the peculiar expression τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοός, and at Col. ii. 18 τοῦ νοός τῆς σαρκός. [See Appendix E.].

D.—DR. WENDT ON THE ARGUMENT OF 1 COR.
XV. 35 F. AND 44 F.

(P. 191 and 250.)

According to the view of Holsten and the inquirers associated with him, the whole discussion of the Apostle in this passage turns on the conception of substance. The opponents, whom Paul combats, had drawn their argument against the possibility of a resurrection of the dead from the sarkic substance of the present human body. Their first premiss had been that the risen must at any rate have an organism, a $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, for which an organised *substance* is requisite; their second premiss was that the *sarkic* substance, of which men are composed, could confessedly not rise; thence they had concluded that no risen $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$, and consequently no rising of the dead at all, is conceivable. This conclusion has, of course, only a meaning, if with the second premiss there be tacitly implied either the one presupposition, that there cannot be a substance of another kind than the earthly-sarkic, or else the other presupposition, that identity between the dead and the risen must take place through the $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha$ of the latter containing the substance of the former. As Paul concedes the correctness of the two chief premisses of his opponents, but nevertheless does not acknowledge the conclusion thence drawn, it follows that he must turn against the two tacit presuppositions which condition their mistaken conclusion. The latter of these presuppositions Paul refutes in verses 36-38; it is not at all necessary, he says, that a resurrection should take place only on the basis of there being an identity between the substance of the risen and that of the dead;

on the contrary, the analogy of the plant-world shows that the naked seed-germ obtains quite a new substantial organism ; and so God may communicate to the resurrection-germ of the dead man an organism, whose substance has nothing to do with the substance of the dead sarkic organism. But the former presupposition must also be invalidated, namely, that no other substance than an earthly sarkic one is possible ; and this is alleged to be done by the Apostle in verses 39-41 through the following argument : As on earth the material substance in different animal organisms is different (verse 39), so are heavenly and earthly bodies substantially differentiated from one another, inasmuch as the heavenly bodies consist of a heavenly light-substance (verse 40), and in their turn on the ground of the very diversity of this light-substance present a different appearance or *δόξα* (verse 41). I must confess that this second part of the argument neither satisfies me thoroughly as to its contents, nor appears to be even outwardly expressed with clearness in the verbal tenor of the verses mentioned. At the best, Paul would only have repeated the assertion, the accuracy of which was the very thing denied by his opponents. In the first place, it is not at all easy to see what he would attain by the adduced analogy of the diversified substance of animal organisms on earth. Possibly, his opponents might take exception to the fact itself, seeing that it is at any rate not easily perceivable, and it is not added by Paul himself, *wherein* such substantial differences consist. And then, even conceding the correctness of this fact, it might be objected that it was not relevant to the question in dispute, for the point under discussion was not whether there are different substances *within* the circle of the *σάρξ*, but whether there are different substances *outside* of the *σάρξ* ; with the utmost substantial diversity

of sarkic organisms one from another, they still retained the decisive substantial unity expressly owned by Paul, that they belonged, all of them, to the *σάρξ*, and the question now was merely whether, alongside of this *σάρξ*, there could exist another substance for organisms. The proposition in verse 40, therefore, which was to be inferred from verse 39, and which it could not but concern the Apostle above all to prove—that, namely, there are heavenly organic substances beside the earthly—remained in fact for the opponents just as improbable after as before. And if we now look at the very words of the text, it is obvious that it cannot have been at all the design of Paul to put forward the substantial diversity of sarkic organisms as a proof or analogy for the possibility of non-sarkic organisms. Had the Apostle wished to express the thought which Holsten (p. 375) thus formulates : “as already, here on earth, the material substance of animal organisms is diverse, so are heavenly and earthly bodies distinguished as regards their substance,” he would doubtless have begun the first clause of verse 40 with a sharply pointed *οὕτως*. This, however, he has not done ; but on the contrary, his declaration that there are bodies of heavenly substance is by a simple *καί* attached to the preceding clause as an introductory presupposition for the chief thought following thereafter (verse 40 b.-41), which is here, just as in verse 39, brought into prominence by a prefixed *ἀλλά*. And what is expressed in this chief thought ? Is it that the heavenly bodies are different as respects *substance* as well from earthly bodies as from one another ? By no means ; but we are told that the heavenly bodies are distinguished from earthly bodies and from each other as regards *δόξα*—*aspect*. For, when Lüdemann (p. 8) renders *δόξα* simply by “light-matter,” he attributes to the word a sense

which would doubtless be very suitable for the connection of his views, but which the word *withal* has not. Holsten translates more cautiously: *appearance* of light-substance; on which we have merely to remark that the more precise definition "of light-substance" added by Holsten, which necessarily was of decisive importance for the connection of the Pauline thought, is *not* added by Paul. The word $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ simply signifies *appearance* alone or, as the case may be, "brilliant appearance"; but that this appearance issues from a light-substance, is a synthetic judgment which is not at all contained in the notion of $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ itself. We should therefore reach the result, that Paul would not have touched at all the proper difficulty of his opponents; he first adduces an analogy of such substantial diversity as can prove very little for the substantial diversity of quite another kind that is sought for; then he annexes the chief point doubted of in some measure as a conceded presupposition, in order at length to speak of a diversity of appearance, which was not at all in question. The starting-point of the opponents was, according to Holsten's statement, the sarkic substance of the present body; the goal which the discussion of Paul reaches is not, however, as Holsten says, the heavenly light-substance of the resurrection-body, but the *aspect* of the resurrection-body, *assuming* it to exist in heavenly light-substance. That starting-point and this goal do not, therefore, duly correspond with one another.

In view of these perplexities we shall the rather be induced to attempt an explanation of our section on the footing of assigning to the word $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\grave{\xi}$ a signification which has its analogies in the *usus loquendi* of the Old Testament, of the LXX., and of the other New Testament writers; *i.e.*, we shall no longer apprehend $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\grave{\xi}$ as

“earthly animated matter,” but instead of this *notional* extension of the original sense of the word shall assume the mere extension of *use*, according to which the word “flesh” is synecdochically employed to denote the whole body, and that not only so far as it is material, but also so far as it is organised. The meaning of our passage becomes thereupon not immaterially altered; the investigation turns no longer on the question what *substance*, but on the question what *form*, what *aspect*, the risen will have. The question of the opponents: ποίῳ σώματι ἔρχονται; signifies not “Of what material will these bodies consist?” but rather “What organisation will they have?” The subject of doubt is not the possibility of the existence of a heavenly material (*Stoffes*), but the possibility that this material, which at any rate is quite of another sort than earthly matter, should not be fitted to become in a similar way somatic organ for a risen πνεῦμα as here on earth the body is organ of the ψυχή. This doubt arises in the minds of the opponents from the circumstance that they cannot form a clear conception to themselves how such a body of another kind would *look*; on account of this impossibility of clearly conceiving the thing, they deny the possibility of the thing itself. Psychologically such doubt is quite intelligible; the man who does not think philosophically acquiesces in the declaration of a thing which he realises in his mind’s eye (*welche ihm anschaulich ist*), and asks no further as to the possibility of its origin and subsistence; whereas mere notional discussions can only with difficulty convince him of the possibility of a thing, so long as it cannot be in any way brought before his mind’s eye (*zur Anschauung*). Against such narrow-mindedness (ἄφρων verse 36), which on account of its own subjective incapacity to conceive a thing thinks that it may be allowed to deny

the objective existence of the thing itself, the Apostle turns with his elucidation. He proves first, by the adduced analogy of plants, that the necessity of thinking of the resurrection-body as organised in quite a different way from the earthly body, and that in a way such as we cannot infer from the shape of the earthly body, contains nothing at all improbable; for the plant-germ in like manner receives an entirely new organism, the nature and shape of which cannot at all be inferred from the seed-grain deposited in the earth. And then the Apostle points to the singularly great variety of organisation in the case of all the bodies which fall within our experience, in order to show that there cannot fairly be any difficulty in assuming a new and different organisation in the case of bodies that do *not* fall within the vision of our experience (*unsere anschauliche Erfahrung*). Thus above all verse 39 now gains a clear meaning; $\sigma\acute{\alpha}\rho\kappa\acute{\iota}\varsigma$ here denotes simply the body of an earthly living being, inclusive of the bodily form; only in respect of this form are earthly bodies different one from another; and to draw attention to this diversity of organisation was immediately in the interest of the Apostle's proof. But as between the earthly bodies cognate to each other distinctions of organisation take place, so such distinctions likewise occur between the earthly and heavenly bodies foreign to each other; and the heavenly bodies themselves in turn are different one from another as to their form. We do not therefore need either to suggest for the word $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ in verse 40 f. a heterogeneous sense, or to supply the chief conception to it; on the contrary the argument of the Apostle turns precisely on the notion of appearance, of aspect, and on nothing more. The correspondence desiderated above between the starting-point of the opponents and the goal at which Paul arrives

seems to me to be in the fullest compass secured by this explanation.

On 1 Cor. xv. 44 ff. Wendt refers to the explanation which we have just given, and proceeds:—

Paul had been engaged in discussion with his opponents as to the new form and organisation of the body, in which the risen must be conceived, and had proved to them that this newness was no argument against its possibility. Now the Apostle takes a further step and shows that the complete diversity of appearance between earthly and heavenly bodies is grounded on the complete diversity of the whole (*gesammten*) nature in the state before and in the state after the resurrection. He first concisely puts forward three points, in respect of which earthly beings are distinguished from the risen, namely in respect of their duration (*φθορά—αφθαρσία*), in respect of their value (*ἀτιμία—δόξα*), and in respect of their power (*ἀσθένεια—δύναμις*). To this he adds as a fourth point of distinction, that the former have a *σῶμα ψυχικόν*, the latter a *σῶμα πνευματικόν*. What is meant by this distinction? Those theologians who think that the whole explanation of Paul in this section turns on the notion of substance and on the substantial diversity between earthly and heavenly bodies, explain in keeping therewith the adjectives *πνευματικόν* and *ψυχικόν* as designating on the one hand the heavenly light-matter, and on the other the earthly, psychico-sarkic matter of the *σώματα*. But against this mode of apprehending the distinction we may urge the following considerations. The analogy of 1 Cor. ii. 14 shows us that the adjective *ψυχικός* is used of a being in which there dwells as mental (*geistige*) power an earthly *ψυχή*, while the adjective *πνευματικός*, when put in contrast to it, is used of

a being in which dwells the divine Spirit. According to this, at our passage the *σῶμα ψυχικόν* signifies a body which encloses an earthly *ψυχή*, and the *σῶμα πνευματικόν* a body in which a divine *πνεῦμα* fills the place of the earthly *ψυχή*.¹ The thoughts of Paul move here not in the categories of form and substance, but in the categories of substantial form and mental (*geistigen*) contents;² the conception *σῶμα* denotes the bodily organism, the substantial diversity of which in heavenly and earthly bodies is not at all thought of (*gar nicht reflektirt wird*) in our words; and the conceptions *ψυχικός* and *πνευματικός* denote the mind-power (*Geisteskraft*), either creaturely or divine, which animates the bodily organism. Although the *ψυχή* does not come into view here, as in ii. 14, directly as human organ of cognition, it is clear withal that we may not except this faculty in any case from the *ψυχή*; it is here a brief designation for the whole compass of the *non-corporeal* side of the earthly man. For the fact that man's earthly mode of existence is really thus definitely characterised by the *ψυχή* in distinction from the heavenly mode of existence in the resurrection-

¹ There does not seem to me much force in the objection of Weiss (*Bibl. Theol. d. N. T.* p. 242) to Wendt's view of *σῶμα ψυχικόν*—viz. that, when the *σῶμα σπείρεται*, i.e. is laid in the grave, the soul has already "departed from the body,"—because the Apostle is speaking of what *had been* the characteristic mark of the body now laid in the grave, as contrasted with what *was to be* its character when raised. If the words are to be thus strictly construed, it is clear that the body as "sown" could no longer be called *ψυχικόν* in any sense, when the *ψυχή* had left it.

² I render the passage literally, though I do not like the expression "substantial form." Moreover, while the German language labours under occasional disadvantage from the use of *Geist* to denote both "spirit" and "mind," the English has no word reproducing exactly the force in such a case as this of the German '*geistig*.'

state, the Apostle now appeals to the expression in the beginning of Genesis (ii. 7): "the first man Adam became a living $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$." To him it appears to be not without significance that at this important passage precisely the expression "soul" is used and not "spirit"; he sees therein a veiled antithetic reference to the second Adam, whose divine nature is characterised by the fact that he is life-making $\pi\nu\epsilon\acute{\upsilon}\mu\alpha$. And only now, after the distinction set up between a psychic and pneumatic mode of existence has been applied (*ausgeföhrt ist*), the Apostle comes at the close to point also to the diversity of substantial constitution (*Beschaffenheit*) of the bodies here and hereafter, attaching it to the comparison between the first and the second Adam (verse 47 f.); the former is of earth, the latter is of heaven, so are those associated (*Genossen*) with Adam earthy ($\chi\omicron\iota\kappa\omicron\iota$) and those associated with Christ heavenly ($\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\upsilon\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\iota\omicron\iota$). But on this very occasion it comes once more very clearly to light that the whole discussion of Paul has for its subject not the diversity of substance, but the diversity of form and shape in the case of earthly and risen beings. For here at the close, when for the first time he brings expressly into prominence the diversity of substance, it serves him withal merely as a further proof, that the *appearance* of the risen is other than the *appearance* of those living on earth: "and, as we have borne the *image* of the earthly (man), so shall we also bear the *image* of the heavenly" (verse 49). Thus, very far from wishing to establish the diversity of substances through the diversity of forms of appearance, the Apostle rather pursues the converse course, and reaches the goal to which his argument, starting from the doubting question of his opponents, had from the outset tended.

E.—ON THE MEANING OF EPH. IV. 23.

(Note to page 212.)

The peculiar expression here used ἀνανεοῦσθαι τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ νοῦς ὑμῶν, which places πνεῦμα in an unique relation to νοῦς, has occasioned some difficulty to expositors. Several explanations have been suggested. Augustine took the genitive by way of apposition: "the spirit which is called mind," but this may be at once set aside as inadequate and improbable. Many have been disposed to construe the genitive as possessive, and to regard πνεῦμα as the dative of the instrument: "by the Spirit which the νοῦς is endued with"—the divine Spirit dwelling in it as the source of renewal. Bishop Ellicott adopts this view as consonant with the predominant usage of Scripture as regards πνεῦμα, and complains of the strong language in which Dr. Eadie has described it as "an evident error" and a "blunder." But, while it is true that πνεῦμα would naturally receive this interpretation if standing by itself alongside of ἀνανεοῦσθαι, it cannot well be taken to mean directly the divine agent, when it is associated with the genitive τοῦ νοῦς ὑμῶν which marks it as belonging to the readers. Meyer rightly holds, in opposition to this view, that "the Holy Spirit bestowed on man is never in the New Testament designated in such a way that man appears as the subject of the Spirit (never τὸ πνεῦμα ὑμῶν)." A second reason, however, urged by him against it—namely, "that it was the object of the Apostle to put forward the moral self-activity of the Christian life"—seems the less cogent, as he has just before maintained that ἀνανεοῦσθαι is to be con-

strued as *passive*, not as *middle*. Meyer, with De Wette and Eadie, prefers a third explanation which takes the genitive as partitive, and the dative as that of reference: "in respect of, as regards, the spirit by which your *voûs* is governed," and he quotes with approval the pithy gloss of Bengel: "*spiritu mentis*, 1 Cor. xiv. 14, *Spiritus est intimum mentis*." The *πνεῦμα* is, in Meyer's view, "the human spirit, different from the divine"; and he describes it as "the *higher life-principle* in man, the *moral power akin to God* in him," "the substratum of the inward man." And Delitzsch, who finds in this passage, taken along with his interpretation of 1 Cor. xiv. 14, a main support for his theory of the *πνεῦμα* of man as "the innermost sanctuary of the heart," complains that "the important psychological conception" which underlies it has not received any satisfactory or at least thorough explanation (*Bibl. Psychol.*, p. 185 f.). He quotes in an Appendix (p. 394 f.) an interesting extract from a work entitled "Scriptural Thoughts as to the powers of the human soul,"—published in 1760 by Professor Heinrich Wilhelm Clemmens—as the only attempt within his knowledge to determine exactly (*festzustellen*) the conception of *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοûs*—an extract, which has at least the merit of being relatively more clear than the exposition of Dr. Delitzsch who has disinterred it, and which seems to me to suggest, on the part of Clemmens, a different and simpler interpretation of the unique expression than that which Dr. Delitzsch has read into it.

The passage runs as follows:—"The powers of grace that work in the soul and regenerate the man constitute [*machen aus*, not 'determine,' as Dr. Wallis renders it] the spirit of man, which thereupon penetrates the whole soul, and, inasmuch as it dwells in the innermost recess of it, is termed the spirit of the mind, *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοûs*.

As such a spirit, it is then in turn (*wieder*) specially subject in a pleasantly passive manner to the Holy Spirit and his gracious operations, which are always continued and advanced in the hearts of believers, and it is related to these operations of the Holy Spirit as human feeling viewed in itself is related to the general assistance of grace or to the first grace common to all men [not, as Dr. Wallis oddly renders: 'that grace which is common to the first man and to all men']. *Spiritus est facultas animae*, Bengel says in this sense, *quum ea Spiritus divini operationem suaviter patitur; et voûs est facultas animae foras progredientis et cum proximo agentis*, 1 Cor. xiv. 14.

With the reason, so far as it rules alone, the word *πνεῦμα*, which points to a foreign power, is not once associated [not, as with Dr. Wallis: 'which points to a foreign power, not for one time only']—a manifest proof that man has in reason a ground determining his actions, which is peculiar to him doubtless, but is quite corrupted by sin. When, on the other hand, the reason is used in good understanding and by those who are under grace, it happens that now and then such an adjunct as *πνεῦμα* is attached to it, inasmuch as believers, precisely because they are under grace, allow their reason and all their thoughts to be animated by the workings of grace, and come to have (*bekommen*) a spirit in themselves, which may thereupon receive and retain in the inmost depth of the soul the impressions of the Holy Spirit, that only now (*erst*) rightly carries forward and completes the state of grace. So at least speaks Holy Scripture; for otherwise we could not understand why at 1 Cor. xiv. 14 *πνεῦμα* and *voûs*, spirit and understanding, are distinguished, and why, according to Eph. iv. 23, the believer is daily to let himself be renewed in the spirit of the understanding, *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοός*.

When the reason works under grace, it becomes ever more skilled in comprehending with all saints what is the breadth and the length and the height and the depth of the knowledge of God, which is in Christ Jesus. At the beginning it attaches itself (*hält sich*) to the first all-present grace which is near to all men; and, if it shows fidelity here, it will become from time to time sur-

rounded with new grace and so pervaded, that a spirit of the powers of understanding (*ein Geist der Verstandskräfte*) animates its working and makes it acceptable to God; and that these powers are, to the praise of the wisdom and glory of the great God and Saviour Jesus Christ, daily renewed, awakened, set in motion, and by the help of the good Spirit that completes the work of grace and his constant influence

Even in the innermost depth of men's souls
Are wedded with the most child-like sighs.

Thus then in this inmost depth of the soul (*Seelengrund*) the *πνεῦμα τοῦ νοῦς*, the spirit of the mind and of all the powers of the soul comes to have (*bekommt*) its dwelling."

Now this passage, although not throughout equally precise and discriminating in its language, does not seem to convey the idea of the *πνεῦμα* as something belonging to man as such, as a part of human nature—"a spirit within the mind," forming its background or substratum—which becomes the seat and sphere of the renewal, and of which psychology may claim to take cognisance as within its domain. It is not, in Clemmens's view, the human, but the divine, basis for the operations of special grace. It is not a thing which man has, but which he *comes* to have (*bekommt*). It is itself not natural faculty or potential aptitude, but a result and product of *first grace*, whereby the mind is prepared for, and made receptive of, the more definite operations in which the Spirit carries forward and completes His work. Nothing could be more plain than the opening statement that the powers of grace at work in the soul and regenerating the man *constitute the spirit*, which thereupon pervades the soul; and the whole passage savours more of grace than of psychology. But for that very reason—because it deals with the matter under the religious aspect—it suggests a better key to the interpretation of the words, than

that duplication of the mental machinery maintained by Delitzsch and others, which, as M. Reuss remarks, we are "tempted to regard as a pleonasm." The *πνεῦμα* is not an inner aspect of the mind itself, nor, as M. Reuss would have it, 'the direction or tendency which the mind takes' in the renewal, but is the influence by which it is guided and governed—the new motive power which comes into it, directs it, rules and effectively controls its action. And the *νοῦς*, having the divinely given *πνεῦμα* as its animating and impelling principle, stands thus diametrically opposed to the *νοῦς τῆς σαρκός*—the mind as directed and controlled by the *σάρξ*—at Col. ii. 18: *φυσιοῦμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦς τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ*, where, looking to St. Paul's use of *νοῦς* to denote the intellect as exercising moral judgment, it is hardly necessary to have recourse to Bishop Lightfoot's ingenious suggestion that the Apostle is here taking up some watchword of the false teachers, who doubtless boasted that they were directed *ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦς*, and are answered by the Apostle, "Yes; but it is *ὁ νοῦς τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν*."

F.—DR. EZRA P. GOULD ON THE NEW TESTAMENT USE OF 'SARX.'

(Note to p. 246.)

In an article contributed to the *Bibliotheca Sacra*, 1875, vol. xxxii., p. 36 ff., Dr. Gould states that his object is "to present a view of this use, that the writer has

not seen elsewhere, and which, if warrantable, removes grave difficulties in the matter of New Testament psychology." His theory is that the use of the term as applied to humanity and to sinful humanity rests on "a recognition of the *σάρξ* as the basis of human descent and propagation"—a meaning which most directly appears in the passages expressive of relationship classed by us under C.

The New Testament passages are classified by him as, 1, Those in which *σάρξ* is used quite literally, at least with no greater departure from the original meaning than is involved in the confusion (?) of *σάρξ* and the wider *σῶμα*; 2, those in which, as the medium of descent, it is the basis of relationship; 3, those, in which *σάρξ καὶ αἷμα* is used as equivalent for man, never the individual, but the *genus homo*, always contrasted with something greater, and so denoting weakness; 4, those where *μία σάρξ* denotes the union in marriage; 5, passages in which it is used for the human race or humanity, where it is observed that "*σάρξ* evidently in the Hebrew mind stands in constant contrast with *πνεῦμα*, and man, as habited in flesh, although endowed with spirit, is described by that which distinguishes him from the world of purely spiritual beings"; and 6, its most important use to denote man's sinful nature, meaning by that the entire man before conversion, or the sinful part, 'the old man,' after conversion.

He objects to the common explanation, which supposes the fleshly or sensual nature of man to be the seat or starting-point of sin, as involving an unwarranted and superficial psychology. . . He thinks that a wide induction of facts would show that in children the sensual passions were the very last to be sinfully excited, and that the first outbreaks of sin were in the region of

spiritual things, especially selfishness and anger. Then, as far as we can understand the probably allegorical account of the fall of man, it was not through his bodily appetites that the tempter reached him. . . . The appeal was rather to his spiritual nature, to which was offered the tempting bait of knowledge. If we attempt to find a class of sins which generally lead to the rest, or a principle universally inherent in sin, he thinks that "we shall fail equally in supporting the charge against the flesh that it is pre-eminently the sinful part of man. It is true that these fleshly sins sometimes furnish the occasion for others through which they reach their ends or revenge the thwarting of them. But such a relation as this is not fundamental enough to warrant the prominence given to *σάρξ*. . . . The mere occasion has no essential connection with the result. . . . If any pre-eminence among sins is to be named it belongs to such sins of the spirit rather than of the sensual nature, as selfishness, malice, revenge, and the like." And he concludes as follows :—

"What then is the reason of this use of *σάρξ* to denote man's sinful nature? I think that we may find the key to an explanation of it in the preceding discussion of its other uses. We have seen that it is used to denote humanity, both in the concrete and the abstract, partly at least because through it the race is propagated. Humanity, which on the natural side owes its continuance to the *σάρξ*, is itself called *σάρξ*. Natural and sarkical are therefore convertible terms in reference to man. On the other side the spirit, *πνεῦμα*, is that through which man is connected with the divine and supernatural, and especially in the new birth. It is there that the divine Spirit works implanting the germs of a new life, and so spiritual and divine or supernatural are also convertible

terms in regard to man. To this let it be added that the natural man connected with the race through the *σάρξ* is sinful, while the new man, connected with God through the *πνεῦμα*, is holy; and does it seem strange that *σάρξ* should itself be used to denote the sinful natural man, and *πνεῦμα* the holy renewed man? It is simply resolved into this: the former is that through which man in his natural state is descended from a sinful race, and inherits a sinful nature, and it is used to denote that nature; while the latter is that, through which and in which God implants a new divine life of holiness, and it is used to denote that life."

This theory seems based on very slender exegetical grounds. The number of passages in which the element of descent comes directly into prominence is but small, and it is only by a *petitio principii* that the conception of sin is specially associated with that descent, while it is not easy to see in what sense Dr. Gould would make his suggested analogy of *πνεῦμα* to bear. The designation of mankind as *σάρξ* is much more naturally explained by synecdoche of the (visible and conspicuous) part for the whole; and the association of sin with the humanity so designated is with more probability referred to an induction of experience than to a special theory of hereditary transmission. Whatever grounds there may be elsewhere for imputing such a theory to St. Paul, Dr. Gould has by no means adduced sufficient warrant for engrafting it on *σάρξ*.

G.—SPECIAL LITERATURE.

The following is a list of the monographs, or special discussions, that I have had opportunity of consulting, exclusive of the works already mentioned in the text or notes, and of books of a more general character that have occasion to deal more or less fully with the questions concerned.

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Auberlen (Dr. Carl August): article "Geist des Menschen im Biblischen Sinne" in the *first* edition of Herzog's Encyclopädie, iv., 728 ff.

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Eklund (P.): *Σάρξ* vocabulum quid apud Paulum Apostolum significet. [Acta Univ. Lundensis, 1871.] 4° Lund, 1871-72.

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I have received, through the kindness of the Editor, a volume and several numbers of the "Chrysanthemum, a Monthly Magazine for Japan and the Far East," containing a series of papers by the Rev. H. Waddell, B.A., "On the Rendering into Japanese of some Theological and Psychological Terms." The chief object of the writer is to call in question the principle on which *πνεῦμα* has been rendered in "the standard Japanese version" by a variety of terms according to the variety of its use, and to maintain that the aim of the translators should be

¹ The limitations which I have imposed on myself (see Lecture I.) preclude me from touching otherwise than incidentally on this doctrine of the Personal Source of the *Πνεῦμα*, to the exposition and defence of which Dr. Smeaton has devoted his valuable work.

to find a single word which shall correspond as nearly as possible in its physical and physiological senses to the Hebrew *ruach* and the Greek *πνεῦμα*. The discussion is interesting, and Mr. Waddell supports his views in an ingenious and elaborate argument; but he has barely as yet (so far as I have seen his papers—up to No. 14) reached the stage of deepest interest, and, I should apprehend, difficulty—namely, the transition to the psychological, and, above all, to the distinctively Christian, use of the term.

In a note subjoined to my General Preface to the translation of Meyer's Commentary (Rom. I. p. xiii. f.) I gave some illustrations of the mode in which German theological works are too often rendered into English. I add a few specimens, out of many that I have met with in the course of reading on the subject of the present volume: eine Werthbestimmung, "an intentional accuracy"; zur Erscheinung bringt, "brings about"; die Erscheinung der menschlichen Natur bestimmt, "affects the nature of the man"; wird bestimmt, "is described" or "is spoken of"; gleichbedeutend, "of kindred significance"; wie hier verbunden (viz., σῶμα and ψυχὴ at Matt. x. 28), "are identified"; fast häufiger, "much oftener"; ohne dass jedoch, "though of course there is"; eine besondere Abhandlung, "a remarkable treatise"; innerlich, "entirely"; neben, "united to"; innwerden, "inner being;" nach biblischen Anschauung, "according to a Biblical inspection"; pneumatische Anlage, "a spiritual beginning"; gliedlich, "material"; Verwechselung, "mistake"; Geist, "soul"; das Gesetzmässe, "the proportion of the law"; persönlich angelegte, "personally interested"; dass mir das Böse vorliegt, "that evil is foremost to me"; Zwecksatz, "the point in view"; s. v. a. ich

bedeute, "means as an equivalent I"; Urhab des Kosmos, "origin of the Kosmos"; solidarische Einheit, "a substantial unity"; es ist also ohne Widerrede gegen die Schrift, "it is thus no contradiction against Scripture"; Nebenordnung, "regular ordination"; die Hauptsache worauf es ankommt, "the principle in which it results." I subjoin a *literal* rendering of three sentences, and place overagainst it the form in which they appear in the English translations, where the meaning is either obscured or reversed.

To designate a being which is without bodily vesture for its inward nature, so that, if we may so speak, it is merely the living [thing] that presents itself, it is natural to use just the word which denotes this inward nature (perhaps in some association with the fundamental signification "breath").

Thence sprang the *dogmatic form*, the fixed idea; but the deep *religious and moral contents*, which soon widened into a speculative stream, emanated here too from Paul's inmost emotional nature and most thoroughly personal experience.

The law, when it heightens sin, serves as a foil [*als Folie*] to the power of grace.

"The word thus comes to denote an essence without, or, not requiring any corporeal garb, or especially any corporeal medium for its inner reality, so that it is only as we simply utter the word which denotes this that the living essence is, so to speak, present ($\pi\nu$. being here perhaps akin to its derivation breath.)"

"Hence it was that the dogmatic form, the fixed idea, and also the deep religious and moral content were derived, which soon widened into a river of speculation; here also was the source of the innermost affections and most personal life of Paul."

"The law, as enhancing sin, treats the power of grace as folly."